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The present paper reconstructs and analyses the assumptions – i.e. the policy theory –
underlying the development of the SME and Entrepreneurship Policy Program in 
general and the Establishment Act and the Loan Guarantee (BBMKB) in particular 
between 1982-2003. The analysis links these assumptions to policy output results and 
policy effects. We find that the foundation of the policy theories of the Establishment 
Act and the Loan Guarantee requires improvement with respect to implicit 
assumptions and lacking warrants. We also find that the implied policy effects cohere 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Dutch SME and entrepreneurship policy program 1982-2003: contents and 
major shifts 
The present report deals with the policy paradigm shift regarding small and medium-
sized enterprise and entrepreneurship policy that the Dutch government has carried 
out between 1982 and 2003. The policy program evolved from defensive SME policy 
toward (more) offensive entrepreneurship policy targeting the entrepreneurial 
function rather than specific businesses and industries. The shift coincided with an 
emergence of dramatic increases in the business ownership rate, especially self-
employed without employees (ZZP-ers), increased business dynamism, and an 
increased integration of big and smaller businesses in the Dutch structure of 
production. 
  We focus on two major aspects of the SME and Entrepreneurship Policy 
program: (1) the Establishment Act and (2) the Loan Guarantee (BBMKB). We 
analyze these policies by means of a policy theory evaluation, which involves a 
systematic analysis of the underlying policy assumptions. We are interested in the 
theoretical foundation of the policies, their output, and their effects. We consider six 
policy notes published by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs: 
 
1982 Het MKB-beleid in Hoofdlijnen 
1982 Startersnotitie 
1987 Ruim Baan voor Ondernemen 
1995 Werk door Ondernemen 
1999 De Ondernemende Samenleving 
2003 In Actie voor Ondernemers 
 
Goal of the present study 
The present report constitutes the fourth study of the policy program. In the first 
report we covered the program in an historical perspective
3; the second report 
involved an eclectic analysis of the program using and combining two 
entrepreneurship policy frameworks
4; the third report focused on the policy formation, 




We conceive policy as a trichotomy: policy content, policy process, and policy effects. 
The first concerns the policy as a means to an end containing ideas, assumptions, and 
the application of economic theory as well as political preference. The policy process 
involves the policy cycle, which is a conceptual cycle through which policy is 
intellectually formed–addressing a policy problem–, constructed, implemented, 
executed, evaluated, and–if necessary or desirable–amended. The policy effects 
involve the implied and documented policy effects of policy. In the present paper we 
primarily deal with the policy effects. 
 
                                                 
3 Kuiper, A.A.B.H. and A.R.M. Wennekers (2008). 
4 Kuiper, A.A.B.H. and A.R.M. Wennekers (2009). 
5 Kuiper, A.A.B.H. (2010).   6 
A fourth notion needed for the analysis is the so-called ‘policy theory’ which we 
define as the underlying assumptions of the policy program. In terms of the 
trichotomy introduced above, the policy theory is a part of the policy content. 
 
More specifically, in the present report the following research questions are addressed 
with respect to the Dutch SME and Entrepreneurship Policy Program that gradually 
evolved during the period 1982-2003: 
 
￿  Which (implicit) policy assumptions (i.e., the policy theory) have existed to justify 
the means (i.e. the Establishment Act and the Loan Guarantee) vis-à-vis the ends 
sought (i.e. sustainable development of the SME sector and financing viable new 
and existing business activities)? 
 
￿  Which policy effects do these (implicit) assumptions imply and to which extent are 
these policy effects consistent with the formal policy objectives, i.e. ends sought? 
 
1.2Theory: Program Theory Evaluation 
Policy theory 
Policy Theory Evaluation (PTE) is an evaluation method based on the concept of 
policy theory. The basic premise of policy theory is that policy can be reconstructed 
by means of distinguishing three relationships: (1) the normative relationship, (2) the 
final relationship, and (3) the causal relationship. A secondary premise of policy is 
that these relationships apply to all policy and human action. The three relationships 
involve the most fundamental categories of human action. The normative relationship 
translates values such as employment creation or economic growth into concrete 
norms and compares economic performance with these norms; the final relationship 
involves policy means and ends; and the causal relationship links social economic 
causes and effects. One cannot deny that all human action involves applying means to 
attain certain ends based upon subjective valuations of reality, which is governed by 
knowable, less knowable, and potentially unknowable regularities or laws. An 
argumentation ethics argument claims that such a denial has to involve exactly the 
application of means in order to attain certain ends, such as arguing against a certain 
argument or premise, adhering to certain norms and values. We adhere to this 
argument. 
Policy ordinarily aims to solve so-called policy problems, which means to 
change reality toward a norm. A norm is an operationalized value. For instance, 
policy makers value economic growth; suppose the Central Bureau of Statistics 
publishes an economic growth rate of 1% while the norm is to have 3% economic 
growth. A discrepancy between reality and the norm exists and consequently policy 
makers will pursue the construction of a policy that would overcome the discrepancy 
casu quo the policy problem. Policy involves the application of means i.e. resources 
to attain desired ends, here: economic growth. Often the desired end consists of a 
proxy end relative to the ultimate end, here: economic growth. Policy makers might 
for example aim to increase the number of start-ups in the economy or to lower the 
cost of doing business by lowering taxes or regulation. Lowering taxes and regulation 
would constitute the means. 
The leap from the normative to the final relationship always involves some 
kind of translation that is influenced by knowledge of best practices, public and   7 
political culture, political feasibility, the amount of money or resources under control 
et cetera. Well-founded policy is based on scientific knowledge, empirical research, 
and theory. Organizational science can inform the practical challenges of the final 
relationship. Social science and economics in particular can inform the causal 
relationship of the policy theory. With regard to the present example, economics can 
identify the causes of economic growth, business start-ups and the determinants of the 
costs of doing business–economics can also shed light on the relationship between the 
costs of doing business and economic growth, i.e. the costs of doing business are 
determined by certain factors but also determine other factors (among which there is 
economic growth). Policy makers can link the final relationship–means and ends–with 
the scientifically founded causal relationship, but can also take the causal relationship 
as the starting point upon which a plausible final relationship, i.e. policy means and 
policy ends, is built. 
Thus, also between the final and the causal relationship a translation has to be 
made. The translation of cause and effect relationships yielded from scientific 
research to coherent policy means and ends is not clear-cut. For one, the causal 
relationships are the result of a complex of human action in the past of which the 
intentions might not be consistent with the results. Policy is based on these causal 
relationships consists of human action now and in the future to attain specific ends in 
the future. Historical relationships between certain variables might change and change 
continuously. Furthermore the means of policy qualitatively differ from the causes in 
the causal relationship. Additionally an increase in the number of business start-ups or 
the decrease of the costs of doing business might have additional effects, besides an 
increase in economic growth, that are contrary to the desired end and scientifically 
yielded effect. Or in other words, policy like any human action involves indirect and 
unintended consequences that can be contrary to the intended end.
6 
 
Normative and descriptive causal model analysis 
The main idea adopted in the present paper is that theoretical analysis should both 
logically and temporally precede any other kind of analysis. For instance, the policy 
content should precede the policy process. On one hand this means that one should 
have a theoretical conception of what one aims to achieve with some policy; on the 
other hand it just means to think before one acts. On yet another hand the statement 
means that one cannot act or think rationally without either explicitly or implicitly 
adopting a theoretical framework. Policy makers and other people alike–such as 
entrepreneurs, citizens, employees, family members, college students et cetera–either 
explicitly or implicitly act rationally, which just means that they apply means to 
achieve ends. Conceptually the means and ends are the policy content of a policy. For 
the analysis of the policy content we use Program Theory Evaluation based on the 
foundations of praxeology. 
  We use the dichotomy normative causal model-descriptive causal model. By 
means of the dichotomy we can conceptually distinguish between what the actors in 
the policy network thought how the policies in the program worked (normative) and 
how these policies actually worked (descriptive). The former, the idea of the 
normative causal model is the starting point for the reconstruction of the formation of 
the policy program in terms of policy content. A normative causal model analysis 
concerns itself with the notion that it is what people think is true that influences their 
actions rather than that merely what objectively is true influences human action.  
                                                 
6More on the issue of indirect and unintended consequences of policy in Kuiper (2012) Ph.D. thesis.   8 
  The latter, the idea of the descriptive causal model is the starting point for the 
reconstruction of the policy process. With the information of official policy 
documents and interviews and then using several tools of understanding (see below) 
we can transform the normative causal models of the persons involved into 
descriptive causal models. In other words, by means of official policy documents and 
interviews we can provide a solid historical reconstruction of the policy process, 
which can claim objectivity–in the sense of inter-subjectivity–as far as the method of 
historic inquiry allows. Specifically, we use the theory of public entrepreneurship, 
network theory, and learning theory as the operationalization of our understanding. 
  The difference between the normative causal model analysis and the 
descriptive causal model analysis in the present study is that the former involves 
merely a descriptive reconstruction of the policy documents and interview data 
without much interpretation using social theory: we limit ourselves to the 
reconstruction of the internal logic of the policy content. The descriptive 
reconstruction of the internal logic is the starting-point for the comprehensive 
descriptive causal model analysis, which does demand social theory for its proper 
execution. 
  The results gained in the causal model analyses are the foundation for the 
policy evaluation of the policy contents. In combination with the appropriate method 
and theoretical knowledge we can reconstruct the (theoretically) implied policy 
outcomes of the policy program and compare these with the official policy objectives 
in the reconstructed normative causal model. 
 
Program Theory Evaluation described 
Leeuw (2003) describes three methods for reconstructing underlying assumptions 
and/or theories of policy and policy programs. These are the empirical-analytical 
method, the strategic assessment approach, and the elicitation methodology. As it is 
the empirical-analytical method that is based on policy theory, we only extensively 
discuss this method. This does not mean that the other two methods could not have 
been relevant for the current study. But as the research goal of the current study is 
limited to reconstructing and evaluating the underlying assumptions of the policy 
program, we can here leave these methods aside. 
  The empirical-analytical method can easily be modified into a method that is 
consistent with praxeology as described in Kuiper (2012). Leeuw (2003) proposes the 
empirical-analytical method as a synthesis of elements adapted from other policy 
analysis methods; he furthermore coins the method as a policy-scientific approach as 
the mentioned scholars are all active in the field of policy analysis and policy 
evaluation. 
  Next we describe the six steps of the empirical-analytical method; then we 
discuss its strengths and weaknesses–as laid out by Leeuw (2003). 
 
The empirical-analytical approach to Program Theory Evaluation in six steps 
1.  Identify the behavioral mechanisms of which it is expected that they will solve the 
policy problem. A search has to be conducted in formal and informal documents 
and interview transcripts for statements that indicate why it is believed that it is 
necessary to solve the social, organizational, or policy problem; and what policy 
objectives are being sought. These statements can point to mechanisms on which 
the policy or policy program drives and of which it is believed that it will make 
the policy or policy program more effective. Examples are: determinants of 
innovation diffusion processes, mechanisms underlying prisoner dilemma games,   9 
processes which produce social capital, cognitive dissonance, different types of 
learning behavior and many more. 
2.  Statements that have the following structure are especially relevant for the 
detection of the mentioned mechanisms: 
a.  “It is evident that x … will work.” 
b.  “In our opinion, the best way to solve the problem is to … .” 
c.  “The only way to solve this problem is to … .” 
d.  “The many years of experience of our institute with regard to x tells us 
that … .” 
3.  Construct an overview of the statements and relate the assumed mechanisms with 
the policy objectives of the policy or policy program under consideration. 
4.  Reformulate the statements into conditional statements, i.e. in the structure of “if-
then” statements or similar statements such as, “more x leads to less y.” 
5.  Search for warrants to find the missing relations within or between the different 
statements by using argumentation analysis. The warrant is the “because” part of a 
line of reasoning; it shows that B follows from A because of a(n) (generally) 
accepted principle. For example, “the organization’s performance will not 
improve next year,” follows from, “the performance of this organization has not 
improved in the last five years,” because of the principle, “past performance is the 
best indicator of future performance.” The “why” part of such a line of reasoning 
is often not being made explicit. This is why these warrants or motivations have to 
be inferred by the person who conducts the policy analysis. 
6.  Reformulate these warrants or motivations in conditional “if-then” or similar 
statements and draw a figure of the assumed causal relationships. 
 
After these six steps the inferred statements, i.e. assumed causal relationships 
underlying the reconstructed program theory, can be evaluated by analyzing them on 
the basis of: 
￿  The logical consistency of the statements; 
￿  The empirical content of the statements, or in other words, the degree to which the 
policy theory and specifically the assumed impact of the behavioral mechanisms 
correspond with the relevant “state-of-the-art” knowledge in the social sciences, 
behavioral sciences, and economic science and; 
￿  The degree to which the theory focuses on variables that can be manipulated or 
steered by means of policy. 
 
Forecasting expected policy outcomes 
Dunn (2004, 129) claims that, “the capacity to forecast expected policy outcomes is 
critical to the success of policy analysis and the improvement of policy making.” 
Three major approaches of policy forecasting are presented: extrapolative forecasting, 
theoretical forecasting, and judgmental forecasting. These approaches rely on 
projection, prediction, and conjecture respectively.
7 Forecasting aims to generate 
information about future changes in policy and their consequences and can be 
instrumental to control, plan and set policy in the best possible way. 
  “A projection is a forecast that is based on extrapolation of current and 
historical trends into the future.”
8 Projections are claims based on arguments from 
method or parallel case, where assumptions about the validity of a method or 
                                                 
7 Dunn (2004), pp.130-131 
8 Ibid.   10 
similarity between cases are used to constitute these claims. Projections may be 
accompanied by arguments from authority or from theory. 
  A prediction however is a forecast based on explicit theoretical assumptions; 
theoretical laws, propositions, or analogies are part of the toolbox. Predictions specify 
causes and effects and they may be accompanied by arguments from authority and 
method (econometric modeling). 
  A conjecture is a forecast based on judgments of an expert regarding the future 
of society. “These judgments may take the form of intuitive arguments, where 
assumptions about the insight, creative intellectual power, or tacit knowledge of 
stakeholders (e.g. “policy insiders”) are used to support designative claims about the 
future.”
910 Conjectures may be supported with arguments from authority, method, 
and/or cause. 
  The present report describes the Establishment Act and the Loan Guarantee 
based on the descriptive causal model and their implied policy effects. 
  Dunn describes several methods for the prediction of policy outcomes of 
existing policies. These methods are: theory mapping, causal modeling, theoretical 
modeling, regression analysis, point and interval estimation, and correlational analysis. 
As we limit ourselves to a qualitative analysis and evaluation we discuss only the first 
three. 
  Theory mapping is used to identify and arrange key assumptions within a 
(policy) theory or (policy) causal argument.
11 It can therefore be used to reconstruct 
policy theories in a systematic fashion. Theory mapping distinguishes between four 
types of causal arguments: convergent, divergent, serial, and cyclic. Convergent 
arguments consist of two or more assumptions on causation, which are used to 
support one claim or conclusion. Divergent arguments consist of one assumption 
supporting several claims or conclusions. Serial arguments consist of using one claim 
or conclusion as an assumption in order to support a series of claims or conclusions. 
Cyclical arguments are serial arguments of which the last claim or conclusion is 
connected with the first one; cyclical arguments therefore may be positively or 
negatively self-reinforcing. 
  Causal modeling and theoretical modeling basically come down to the same 
method as policy analysis: the reconstruction of the assumptions with regard to policy 
content and program theory evaluation. Our claim that it is possible and sensible to 
forecast expected policy outcomes by reconstructing underlying policy assumptions 
and evaluating these on their merit vis-à-vis theoretically substantiated forecasts of 
their implied outcomes finds support in the overview given by Dunn. 
 
In part 2 we conduct a PTE analysis regarding the Establishment Act and the Loan 
Guarantee by means of (1) a walkthrough of the policy notes published by Economic 
Affairs between 1982-2003 and (2) focusing on the (implicit) policy assumptions of 
these two policy instruments. 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 This description of forecasting policy outcomes relates to what in Kuiper (2012) is discussed as 
public entrepreneurship. 
11 Ibid., p. 163   11 
2. A program level Program Theory Evaluation (PTE) 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we apply the empirical-analytical method to PTE on the Dutch SME 
and Entrepreneurship Policy Program during the period 1982-2003, as elaborated in 
the consecutive policy notes written by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In 
particular, the PTE analysis focuses on the Loan Guarantee and the Establishment Act. 
The PTE analysis yields a reconstruction of the normative causal model, i.e. a 
reconstruction of the assumptions, logical arguments, and behavioral mechanisms of 
the policy theory of the policy makers of Economic Affairs. The focus is on the 
relationship between the policy content and the policy effects.  
The former includes the policy input, the policy throughput or the production 
process, and the policy output or the products and services provided; the latter 
involves the policy outcome. The focus will be on the assumptions, logical arguments 
and behavioral mechanisms that link the former with the latter, or in other words: we 
aim to reconstruct the arguments and warrants that link the policies to real-world 
effects. These arguments and warrants, which ought to be based on social scientific 
knowledge, have to be consistent with the ends sought, which in their turn have to 
have a sound logical relationship with the effects sought. 
  For instance, the assumptions, logical arguments, and behavioral mechanisms 
of the Loan Guarantee and Establishment Act, which constitute the logical structure 
of the policy input, throughput, and output have to be consistent with the ends sought 
as well as with the policy effects. When these links are not present in the policy 
theory, which as we will see is sometimes the case, we question this lacuna and 
consider several assumptions, logical arguments, and behavioral mechanism that are 
implicit in the logical structure of the policies. 
 
2.2 Het MKB-Beleid in Hoofdlijnen (1982) &Startersnotitie (1982) 
From a logical perspective the policy theory at the program level makes sense. The 
values are starting points of the SME policy program and constitute the normative 
relationship of desired status of economy and society and the status quo. The 
normative relationship is translated into two major policy lines: (1) Integration Policy 
and (2) Functional Policy. The two policy lines constitute the means and ends 
relationship of SME and entrepreneurship policy until the policy note Ruim Baan 
voor Ondernemen (1987). The ends sought are more and better entrepreneurship via 
start-ups and incumbent businesses, which should lead to more employment creation 
casu quo less unemployment and to more economic growth. This final relationship is 
related to several causal characteristics of the position of SMEs in the wider economic 
policy program–Integration aspects–and causal characteristics of SMEs as such and 
vis-à-vis big(ger) business. 
  The causal relationships of the policy program theory are of a logical nature. If 
SME characteristics and interests are addressed casu quo integrated in the general 
economic policy and if specific characteristics of SMEs are addressed then this would 
surely lead to a better and bigger SME sector, which de facto constitutes economic 
growth and more employment. The program theory of the Start-up Note coincides 
with the Functional Policy line; see Figure 1. 
 
   12 
 
 




The 1982 policy notes contain legal, economic, and communicative instruments while 
physical instruments of any sort were absent–this is true for the entire 1982-2003 
period. The Establishment Act along with the SME Instrumentarium
12 constituted the 
legal aspect of the SME policy program. The former defines economic criteria within 
a legal framework for business entry. The latter involves the players in the SME 
Instrumentarium, which were legally set in the sense that the government determined 
certain formal tasks of these organizations. These players were responsible for the 
operational policy within the SME Instrumentarium as they were set-up with certain 
instructions and guidelines regarding the execution of policy, laws, and regulations. 
Both the Establishment Act and the SME Instrumentarium constitute 
institutional policy, as they established the rules of the game with regard to starting a 
business and the products and services that new and incumbent businesses were 
allowed to provide by law. Additionally, these policies allocated the tasks and 
responsibilities regarding the public management of the SME sector within the policy 
network. While the Establishment Act and the comprehensive SME Instrumentarium 
have been the result of the progressive, change-oriented vision in which a strong 
government is combined with a comprehensive labor and business representation 
framework; however in the 1980s the belief in this vision slowly faded when the 
Western economies and as a result public provision of goods and services slowed 
down. As set rules of the game and the resulting institutional framework, with its 
allocation of tasks and responsibilities, tend to be rigid and as new ideas challenging 
the status quo work through the political process rather slowly, the Establishment Act 
and the SME Instrumentarium constituted the regulatory remains of the historical 
progressive vision. 
  Internal and external financial policies were the economic instruments in the 
SME policy program, which respectively contained fiscal policies and financial –loan 
                                                 
12The so-called MKB Instrumentarium included small business employer organizations, advisory 
organizations, training institutes et cetera.   13 
and credit– facilities. These tactical policy instruments distributed capital resources in 
a way that aligned with what in the policy theory was considered more socially, 
economically, and/or politically desirable. Politically the policies were facilitory for 
certain economic behavior, i.e. investing and starting-up business with newly acquired 
loans or credits; and stimulatory to certain target groups, i.e. (unemployed that could 
become) start-ups and incumbents SMEs. 
  Entrepreneurship courses and information provision and advice constituted the 
communicative instruments in the SME policy program and were aimed to guide 
(prospective) entrepreneurs into the rules of the game of business set up via the 
institutional framework of the Establishment Act, SME Instrumentarium, and general 
(economic) policies including the tax code, labor and social security issues et cetera. 
 
 
Het MKB-beleid in Hoofdlijnen; Loan Guarantee and Establishment Act 
The policy note is the main policy document of which the Start-up Note is a target 
group specific spinoff. The note constitutes the first step toward a reappraisal of the 
SME policy program, which is based upon four premises: (1) the entrepreneur is 
primarily responsible for his own business; (2) the government should be reticent; (3) 
for policy efficiency, policy should be either regionalized or decentralized; (4) policy 
effectiveness should be increased.
13 
 
The first two premises seem to be inconsistent with the Loan Guarantee and 
Establishment Act. One could argue that when entrepreneurs are assumed to be 
primarily responsible for their businesses and the government should be reticent then 
the government should not set minimum requirements for business entry, because 
otherwise the government is primarily responsible for businesses and hardly remains 
reticent. On the other hand, this argument can be perceived as a subjective evaluation 
of both the premises and policies in place. It is in the eye of the beholder, casu quo the 
held policy theory, to determine the Establishment Act a government responsibility 
that precedes the responsibility of the entrepreneur and that the Act in fact represents 
a reticent government. 
  Policy efficiency can indeed be achieved by means of decentralization. Policy 
efficiency involves the relationship between policy input and policy output–the 
efficiency of the policy achievements–and between policy input and policy outcome–
policy cost effectiveness. Decentralization can increase the quality of the policy 
output with the same policy input. If a causal relationship exists between policy 
output and policy outcome, increased efficiency of the policy achievements implies 
increased policy costs effectiveness. 
Increased policy efficiency by improving the relationship between input and 
output or outcome can also improve policy effectiveness, which involves the 
relationship between policy output and policy outcome. When policy output is 
increased and a causal relationship exists between policy output and policy outcome 
effectiveness increases. Improving accessibility, speed, and simplicity of procedures 
improves the policy output, which increases the policy outcome. 
 
PTE analysis of the Loan Guarantee 
The Loan Guarantee (or then-called KMKB) assumes that providing credit and loan 
guarantees in addition to self-financing and conventional financers is a good thing. 
                                                 
13 EZ (1982b), Het MKB-Beleid in Hoofdlijnen, pp. 7-9.   14 
We phrase it as ‘a good thing’ because the note provides no explicit policy objective. 
Because the policy is in place we can safely assume that the policy makers deem the 
policy a good thing. 
  The note mentions that the policy effectiveness of the KMKB is threatened by 
the lengthiness of the application procedure combined with a strongly increased 
demand for the facility.
14 The quantity of policy output–i.e. additional credit and loan 
provision than otherwise would have been the case, is threatened, which restricts the 
policy outcome–i.e. additional viable businesses than otherwise would have been the 
case. This illustrates that the policy makers indeed assume a causal relationship 
between policy output and policy outcome, but both the policy outcome and the 
relationship between policy output and policy outcome are not made explicit or 
warranted. This constitutes a serious policy theory lacuna, which cannot be reconciled 




The lack of a policy theory foundation for the KMKB might imply that the policy 
makers perceive the policy mostly as social policy, i.e. redistributive policy without 
warrants that imply the policy to be a positive sum game. Social policy differs from 
economic policy in the sense that economic policy can be redistributive policy, but 
does contain warrants that imply the policy to be a positive sum game or does not 
contain warrants that imply the policy to be a zero or negative sum game.
16 
 
PTE analysis of the Establishment Act 
The Establishment Act functions as an instrument to restrict entry of low-quality and 
undesirable business start-ups, which may harm competition and the consumer or may 
overflow over-capacitated
17 markets. In the policy note, the State Secretary of 
Economic Affairs states that the Liquor and Hotel and Catering Law will be 
integrated into the Establishment Act.
18 Additionally the establishment resolutions in 
retail will be tightened.
19 
  This implies that the general policy theory underlying the Act formally was 
still in place, i.e. that the Act represents a systematic policy effort to restrict business 
entry for unqualified entrepreneurs favoring fair competition among SMEs and the 
consumer. 
  The reappraisal of the SME policy implied that the Establishment Act was 
reappraised on four aspects: (1) establishment resolutions, (2) the economic activities 
subject of establishment resolutions, (3) the establishment requirements, and (4) the 
manner in which entrepreneurs can fulfill the establishment requirements.
20 
  With regard to (1) the establishment resolutions were assessed with regard to 
their utility and necessity. This implies that some resolution might have been 
counterproductive to the general objective of the Act, which might have unnecessarily 
restricted business entry. With regard to (2) the State Secretary reconsidered which 
economic activities mentioned in establishment resolutions can be deregulated. With 
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 34. 
15 Ibid. 
16 We non-precisively abstract from the sunk costs of the policy input, throughput, and carrying out of 
the output. 
17 Or in Carree and Thurik terminology (Carree and Thurik, 1999): may overflow markets of which the 
carrying capacity has been exhausted.  
18 Ibid., p. 53. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 54.   15 
regard to (3) the trade knowledge requirements were reconsidered and tightened. 
Industry-specific trade knowledge requirements were conceived in order to attain a 
high quality of business entries. With regard to (4) a reconsideration of establishment 
tests is mentioned.
21 
  More generally the State Secretary pursues a tightening of establishment 
resolution by maintaining these resolutions. He counters the arguments for a freer 
establishment of simple economic activities with the notion that moonlighters 
compete with conventional SMEs that do have to fulfill the establishment resolutions. 
However, dispensation policy can respond to societal developments, but the policy 
should be combined with the condition that potential market disruptions, such as 
unfair competition should be investigated.
22 
  So while there are no explicit behavioral mechanisms mentioned in the policy 
note we can assume that the policy makers remain confident about the notion that if 
entry requirements are in place and construed, implemented, and executed effectively 
then quality SMEs will enrich the Dutch economy with additional (fair) competition 
and quality goods and services for the Dutch consumer. The policy note does however 
provide no arguments for this assumed causal link. As this implicit assumption is not 
combined with specific behavioral mechanisms and warrants we are compelled to 
conclude that with regard to the Establishment Act a serious lacuna was present.  
                                                 
21 Ibid., pp. 54-58. 
22 Ibid., pp. 56-58.   16 
Start-up Note: Loan Guarantee and Establishment Act 
The Start-up Note (1982) observes an increased attention among the unemployed to 
become one’s own employer; the policy makers state that in times of decreas 
ed spending and increased competition the perspectives of new businesses are less 
favorable than in better economic times. Incumbent businesses strive for continuity by 
expanding their business to new markets; decreased spending and increased search for 
new markets, which in combination with low entry obstacles for new businesses 
might lead to a recurrence of the 1930s.
23 This is the major argument underlying the 
Establishment Act, which sets minimum entry criteria for business start-ups by law. 
  The policy makers then mention various market opportunities and the demand 
for market opportunity research by the SME Instrumentarium, which has to be kept 
up-to-date.
24 By means of the market opportunity research government policy aims to 
deter business entry in markets with overcapacity and promote business entry in 
markets with good market perspectives.
25 Information provision, not giving income 
support, and not providing guarantees on credits and loans can deter undesirable 
market entry. Promotion of business entry in markets with opportunities can be 
achieved with inverse policies along with provision of low-priced business housing 
and an extension of fiscal facilities for start-ups.
26 
  The policy makers’ stance on the Loan Guarantee casu quo the KMKB and the 
arrangement for private participation companies (PPM) should be perceived from 
these considerations. Irrespective of whether start-ups aim to enter a market with 
overcapacity or undercapacity, financing problems of start-ups often involves a bad 
business plan either combined or not with a lack of confidence among potential 
financiers. When the business plan and the confidence are fine then financing a new 
business venture seems to be much easier.
27 
  The Start-up Note then focuses on policy that assists start-ups in attaining 
finance when the start-up cannot attain finance by means of the conventional 
channels.
28 What is noteworthy here is that the policy makers provide no explicit 
arguments of why this policy should be implemented. It seems that the policy makers 
implicitly consider the credit and loan requirements of private financers a market 
failure, i.e. that the conventional credit and loan market provides a less than optimal 
level of credits and loans. This begs the question why the government should step in 
to provide guarantees instead of fixing the perceived policy problem more directly 
from the supply-side. We phrase the problem as a perceived one for two reasons: 
firstly, policy problem are subjective: start-ups excluded from the credit and loan 
market would not be considered a problem when one assumes that this market is 
functional; secondly, sidestepping the selection mechanism set by suppliers of credits 
and loans might not solve the perceived problem and might create new policy 
problems (both related to the receivers of the guarantees as well as the 
implementation and execution aspects of the policy). In other words, it is reasonable 
to expect a stance of the policy makers on the functioning of the conventional credit 
and loan market and the role of existing rules and regulations in this market. 
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24 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
25 Ibid., p. 14. 
26 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
27 Ibid., p. 35. 
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PTE of the Loan Guarantee 
The behavior mechanisms assumed in the policy theory are somewhat superficial. 
There exist potential start-ups, including unemployed that lack savings for internal 
financing or lack collateral for external financing. Additionally, there are markets that 
have overcapacity or undercapacity. When start-ups are excluded from the credit and 
loan market the government has put a facility in place that evaluates the start-ups by 
the criteria of occupational skills of the entrepreneur and the future perspective of the 
business. Implicitly it is assumed that promoting start-ups in this manner–sidestepping 
the conventional credit and loan market–is a good thing for the economy, i.e. for 
employment and economic growth.  
  Considering the market opportunity research one can ask the question why this 
should be combined with a credit and loan facility. If the required knowledge is there, 
government-sponsored credit and loan facilities seem unnecessary, as the 
conventional suppliers would eagerly supply the start-ups with credits and loans. The 
market opportunity research can then be perceived as a subsidy to the auditing and 
credit and loan application divisions of the credit and loan providers. If the subsidized 
market knowledge does not lead to an increased provision of credits and loans then it 
would beg the question of why the conventional suppliers are skeptical and whether 
the government-sponsored facility is more risky than a market oriented supplier of 
business finance would want to bear. Because credits and loans are ultimate based on 
(often leveraged via fractional reserve banking) savings this means that the supply of 
credits and loans is finite. It is perfectly possible that a majority of the rejected credit 
or loan applicants can make a profit with their businesses, but that there simply are 
not enough savings to fund these activities. The question then arises why the 
government should divert money from other public goods and services or from the 
private sector (via taxation, increased public borrowing or money creation) to these 
SMEs. 
In the case of hesitancy among the conventional credit and loan suppliers, 
investigation into the rules and regulation, barriers, and obstacles in the credit and 
loan industry would be opportune. Why are the suppliers of capital, who want to 
make a profit, hesitant of taking these credits and loans? Commonly, the argument put 
forward goes that banks and other financers have to invest too much money in 
research and audit costs in order for the smaller credits and loans to be profitable. 
This begs the question of why no smaller more flexible financial entities can exist as 
they emerge in every market. If these small credits and loans were profitable then 
market discovery would lead to an increased supply of credits and loans. When this 
does not happen the government, policy makers, private entrepreneurs should 
investigate why this is the case. If the credits and loans are not profitable one has to 
ask the question whether it is really a market failure that these credits and loans are 
not provided by the conventional suppliers of finance. Additionally one could ask the 
question of whether the credit and loan facility involves a social redistributive policy 
rather than an economic policy. 
  Our observations and questions are not mentioned in the Start-up Note, which 
means that the Note contains no behavioral mechanisms or warrants regarding policy 
effects for the policy demanded by rational evidence-based scientific policy. 
 
PTE of the Establishment Act 
The Establishment Act constituted the reaction of the Dutch government regarding the 
big inflow–and consequent outflow–of businesses in the 1930s as a result of a major 
increase in unemployment, which allegedly undermined fair market competition and   18 
market stability among SMEs. The Establishment Act sets minimum requirements for 
business start-ups in order to increase the success rate of business start-ups that pass 
the selection mechanism. The minimum requirements involve three categories: 
general business knowledge, occupational skills, and creditworthiness. The 
requirements result in better-prepared business start-ups as well as healthy 
competition.
29 Implicitly, the minimum requirements constitute a minimum level of 
business quality and investment: businesses with lower investments in general 
business knowledge and occupational skills combined with a shaky creditworthiness 
are not allowed to compete with businesses that meet the minimum requirements.  
Explicitly, the minimum requirements also benefit the consumer because the 
consumer has an interest in sound products and services, especially when safety or 
health is a factor.
30 The behavioral mechanism involved here goes as follows: if 
business start-ups meet the minimum requirements set by the Establishment Act then 
these businesses are more likely to succeed, will be involved in fair market 
competition with incumbent businesses, and will benefit the consumer in a better 
manner than otherwise would have been the case. The warrant for the behavioral 
mechanism basically involves past experiences with major inflows of business start-
ups in the 1930s. Why this major inflow has occurred or why the Establishment Act 
would constitute a solution for this perceived problem is not explained in the note. 
The behavioral mechanism does express a relationship between policy content and 
policy effects, but the opportunity costs, potential indirect or unintended 
consequences, or policy alternatives are not provided. 
Basic economic knowledge states that an artificial obstacle of market entry not 
merely constitutes an obstacle for potential entrants, but can also function as a 
defensive shield for incumbent businesses.
31 As a result of this shield these 
incumbents may become less prone to be competitive because fewer businesses will 
be in the market than otherwise would have been the case. The entry requirements 
might also prevent business entry that would satisfy a consumer demand but does not 
meet the requirements. The implementation of the Establishment Act also disregards 
the fact that the policy was promoted by employer organizations, which represent the 
interests of incumbent businesses. While consumers applaud market competition 
because it commonly results in lower prices and higher quality, businesses prefer less 
competition to more competition because then businesses can get away with higher 
prices and lower quality. The protection of the Establishment Act potentially 
exacerbates this behavioral mechanism. Additionally, the Act limits consumer choice. 
It is perfectly possible that some consumers prefer goods or services with lower 
quality that are lower priced provided by businesses that do not meet the requirements 
set by the Establishment Act. These considerations are not expressed in the note. 
 
2.3 Ruim Baan voor Ondernemen (1987) 
Ruim Baan voor Ondernemen’s policy theory departs from the central value of a 
favorable business climate for start-ups and incumbent SMEs. Four underlying policy 
problems were addressed: (1) too little dynamism in the SME sector, and SME policy 
was too much focused on incumbent SMEs; (2) unexploited SME potentials as a 
result of too little dynamism; (3) a lack of good quality businesses, a lot of start-ups 
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were poorly prepared and many incumbents poorly complied with rules and 
regulations and market demand; (4) too many vested interests in the SME 
Instrumentarium, which is inconsistent with a favorable business climate in general 
and specifically hampers market dynamism and change for a more effective and 
efficient policy framework. 
 
For an overview of the program theory at the program level, see figure 2. Like in 
1982, the program in 1987 included integration policy and functional policy. The 
Integration Policy consisted of social economic and fiscal policy, informal economic 
policy, self-employment policy, deregulation, as well as local policy. 
   




The fiscal policy instruments are economic and tactical in nature and aimed to help 
SMEs to freely and optimally allocate their own resources. In this way the policy 
instruments relieve the economy casu quo the SMEs of the negative supply side 
effects of taxation. The policies could be perceived as ‘negative-negative’, i.e. 
positive, stimulatory policy from a political perspective, as taxation results in negative 
supply side effects regarding private enterprise and the reduction (hence negative) of 
taxation therefore diminishes the effect. From an analytical standpoint the fiscal 
policy is rational in nature, as the objective is exactly to soften the tax burden upon 
SMEs. 
  Policies with respect to the informal economy consist of legal policy 
instruments, which aim to practically affirm the rules and regulations of doing 
business, such as compliance with licensing and the payment of taxes. This includes a 
communicative aspect to the policy line. It constitutes both institutional and 
operational policy as the rules of the game are affirmed and the relevant agencies are 
instructed to carry out the law. Politically the policy is regulatory in nature and 
analytically cultural and constitutional aspects apply, as a shared meaning of properly 
doing business and policy as rules are communicated. 
  Self-employment policy involves economic instruments, which assist the self-
employed via fiscal facilities and via information and advice facilities. There is a legal   20 
aspect in this policy line as some instruments aim to level the legal entitlements of the 
self-employed to social facilities with how other businesses are treated. The 
instruments are tactical as resources are distributed toward the self-employed; 
politically distributive and redistributive aspects apply to the fiscal and support 
facilities respectively. The policy is rational in nature as self-employed are both seen 
as a vulnerable and promising economic group. 
  Deregulation consists of legal instruments that aim to lift unnecessary and 
burdensome regulations, which disproportionately burden SMEs, for example because 
SMEs tend to lack specialized staff for rules and regulation compliance. Deregulation 
involves institutional policy as the rules of the game are revised; politically 
deregulation involves exploratory policies as two commissions were put in place to 
study a deregulation test and the administrative burden respectively. Additionally 
deregulatory policies were in place as regulations in many areas were simplified or 
discarded. Analytically deregulation policy involves a rational approach, as the 
objective is to soften the regulatory burden upon business and the government as the 
compliers and enforcers respectively. It also involves the institutional approach as 
some of the instruments introduce a test of current and future regulations proposals, 
which constitutes policy as rules by the government on the government. 
  Regional and local policy predominantly involved communicative instruments 
with an operational intention; lower aggregation levels of government become 
responsible for adequate facilities at the local and regional level. The central 
government provides these administration levels with research-based guidelines on 
how to regulate and license business establishment. Additionally the central 
government will play a facilitatory role in bringing together business, education, 
research, and local governments. The approach is institutional in nature in order to 
make the institutional framework more conducive for efficiency and exploiting the 
degree of scope of activities such a framework can cover.  
 
In addition, the Functional Policy consisted of education, establishment policy, 
financing policy, information provision and advice policy, technology policy, trade 
and subcontracting policy, and export policy. The policy line involves promoting 
entrepreneurship in (vocational) high schools and intensifying entrepreneurship 
courses for incumbent entrepreneurs in cooperation with the business organizations. 
The creditworthiness criterion of the Establishment Act is dropped and the Act was to 
be evaluated in 1988 in which abolition, reform, and maintaining the Act would be 
considered as the three policy options. The financial and fiscal facilities as-is are 
considered satisfactory; the evaluation of the Loan Guarantee/Credit Decision 1985 is 
economically favorable but procedures are complex and take too long. This is why the 
Loan Guarantee 1988 will be implemented in which banks carry out the facility, start-
up facilities are extended, and the unemployed credit facility is taken into the general 
Loan Guarantee procedure. With respect to their information provision businesses 
themselves are responsible. SME policy is supplementary: it provides a general 
supply-subsidized facility and a demand-subsidized facility for specialist advice; the 
subsidies for management assistance are extended and Innovation Centra information 
provision is increased. Generally, the central government aims to decentralize 
information and advice provision to the regional level. As outsourcing by big(ger) 
business is becoming a trend an Action Program will be implemented to facilitate this 
transition. For export policy the EVD plays an important role in information and 
advice provision.   21 
  The policy line was predominately economic in nature, except for the 
Establishment Act policy initiatives, which are legal in nature. The policy line 
involved incremental institutional, tactical, and operational policies; the rules of the 
game are proposed to be amended via the Establishment Act, functional policies are 
targeted at the facilitation of SMEs, and central and regional agencies are instructed 
with new and reaffirmed guidelines. Politically a wide range of instruments surface: 
distributive fiscal policies, redistributive subsidies, deregulatory Establishment Act 
amendments, facilitory Loan Guarantee reform, and stimulatory education and 
information and advice initiatives. 
  Overall the rational approach is applicable, which echoes the statements made 
by secretary of state Van Zeil in the 1982 notes. 
  With regard to start-up policy Ruim Baan voor Ondernemen addresses 
financing, fiscal facilities, information provision, advice and assistance, education, 
technology, business housing, employment provision, and deregulation, as discussed 
above. 
 
Ruim Baan voor Ondernemen; Loan Guarantee and Establishment Act 
The note describes the Establishment Act as a policy effort to set minimum 
requirements for business start-up in the 1930s, when a lot of unemployed fled to self-
employment without having sufficient knowledge and financial means. Keeping the 
incapable out of the SME sector was the initial policy objective of the Act. Later the 
policy makers perceived the opportunity to manage business entry vis-à-vis market 
capacity. The 1954 version of the Act involves the same management model but 
emphasized the quality aspect of business entry. In 1971 the numerous establishment 
resolutions with regard to the retailing sector were put into the Establishment Act 
Retail.
32 
  While the Establishment Act sets requirements for market entry, financial 
policy aims to alleviate barriers to the capital market. Taking into consideration the 
advices of the RMK and WRR the government aims to promote the formation of risk 
equity among SMEs by means of (partly) guaranteeing commercial bank loans.
33 The 
note mentions several procedural inefficiencies of the KMKB, which were identified 
in the 1986 evaluation. The recommendations resulted in a one-stop shop set-up by 
letting the banks carry out the facility.
34 
 
PTE analysis of the Loan Guarantee 
The basic policy theory of the Loan Guarantee as described in Ruim Baan voor 
Ondernemen remained the same as expressed in previous notes. The 1986 evaluation 
of the facility yielded recommendations for technical improvement for both policy 
efficiency, i.e. the relationship between policy input and policy output, and policy 
effectiveness, i.e. the relationship between policy output and policy outcome. 
However, no behavioral mechanisms or warrants are mentioned that make the policy 
effectiveness relationship explicit. We have to concur that the relationship between 
the new policy output and the creation of a capital market that better serves small 
businesses–as the desired policy outcome–is implicitly there, but warrants for the 
relationship between policy output and net economic growth and net employment 
creation are simply lacking. 
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PTE analysis of the Establishment Act 
Ruim Baan voor Ondernemen provides an overview of the assumed policy effects of 
the Establishment Act.
35 The qualitative part of the Act, i.e. the establishment 
requirements regarding occupational knowledge and general aspects of 
entrepreneurship, influences economic growth in a positive manner. The policy 
makers expect that the qualitative aspect promotes a more skilled, rational, and 
efficient business operation resulting in a lower business failure rate. The influence of 
the quantitative aspect of the Act, i.e. the entry barrier, on economic growth is more 
difficult to determine. On the one hand the entry barrier can restrict unhealthy 
competition by one-day flies. On the other hand the policy makers argue that high and 
manifold entry barrier can hamper healthy economic development, not only among 
start-ups but also among incumbents that want to expand their activities into other 
adjacent markets where other establishment resolutions are in place. 
According to the logic of the policy theory, we deduct, healthy economic 
development does not include the entry of short-lived enterprises. However, the 
policy makers do not merely value the detailed scheme of establishment resolutions 
merely in a positive manner. The Act could be focused more on entrepreneurial skills 
rather than occupational skills, which can be promoted by means of subsidized 
courses or private recognition arrangements rather than a complex scheme of 
establishment resolutions.
36 
Resolutions should be less restrictive, more global and should promote 
development opportunities for SMEs. As the Act is being evaluated three possible 
scenarios are considered: (1) the Act as-is; (2) a simplified Act; (3) the abolition of 
the Act. The self-regulating ability of the market as an alternative to the Act as-is was 
being studied when the note was published. 
 
The note questions the policy outcome of the Establishment Act. It explicitly 
questions the relationship between the Act as the policy output and the business 
environment for start-ups and incumbents as a result, i.e. the policy outcome, of the 
Act. The note does not point out specific behavioral mechanisms or warrants for these 
assumptions other than implicitly stating that obstacles of doing business result in 
higher costs of doing business and therefore results in less business. 
  Although we study the history of the Establishment ex post facto, the attitude 
of the note expresses the preference for either simplification of the Act or abolition of 
the Act. Interviews with policy makers suggest that the idea of the abolition of the 
Establishment Act had been present as early as the late 1970s. 
 
2.4 Werk door Ondernemen (1995) 
Werk door Ondernemen focuses on employment creation as its main value. The norm 
it sets for the Dutch economy resulted in the conclusion that SME potentialities were 
not fully exploited, as the number of employment creating businesses lags while the 
labor force increased. This constitutes a market failure–although the word is not used 
in the note–which could be addressed by means of policy as the characteristics of 
(high) growth SMEs can be operationalized and promoted by policy. 
  The Gazelles or high-growth businesses capture one third of the gross 
employment growth while they constitute only 5-10 percent of the incumbent 
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businesses. Moderately growing firms and new firms are each responsible for another 
one third of job creation. Often  Gazelles are SMEs and they can be characterized as 
being flexible toward market change, thus having a deliberate market orientation, 
while combining a relative focus on R&D and export of their products. 
The combined norms and values result in the operational objective to exploit 
the employment potential of the SME sector. The policy note approaches this 
objective in a threefold manner: via increasing room for entrepreneurship in general, 
and increasing room for start-ups and high-growth businesses in particular. 
Five operationalized policy themes are targeted in attaining the three policy 
lines: (1) Fiscal facilities, (2) Deregulation, (3) Quality of Entrepreneurship, (4) Labor, 
and (5) Finance. 
The fiscal facilities concern fiscal aspects of internal finance of business 
activities, i.e. to what degree businesses can preserve their income or lower the labor 
or capital costs of doing business vis-à-vis taxation. The policy theme also concerns 
fiscal aspects of external finance policies, which concerns tax breaks for private/non-
banking system financing of business activities. Just as in the previous notes, fiscal 
facilities are economic instruments to influence the behavior of economic agents. Tax 
breaks are perceived as subsidies for certain behavior as these tax breaks are targeted 
at specific groups. In this sense the fiscal facilities constitute tactical policy that 
facilitates certain behavior; the rational approach applies. 
The deregulation policies concern a reduction or simplification of legal 
compliance requirements regarding shop closing times, administrative burden, zoning 
within the Big Cities, establishment act reform, and a policy that facilitates the 
transition from unemployment to self-employment. The reduction (in number or 
comprehensiveness) of these legal instruments constitutes institutional policy as 
policy makers aim to change the rules of the game of doing business. Politically 
deregulation constitutes the reduction of policies that compel economic agents what to 
do and what not to do, converting the opportunity costs of compliance into more 
economically productive business activities. Analytically, deregulation policies 
constitute a rational approach, as the objective is to obtain a more flexible business 
environment and to reduce the (economic and non-economic) costs of carrying out 
these regulations. 
The Quality of Entrepreneurship policy line concerns/ed the set-up of agencies 
that deal with the support of start-ups and (high-)growth businesses. The institutional 
policy that underlies it allocates certain tasks and responsibilities that are not 
sufficiently provided through private voluntary exchange and goods and services 
provision. Several political aspects can be associated with the policy line: firstly the 
policy line constitutes a political vision in which entrepreneurship is made more 
broadly attainable including underprivileged start-ups, immigrants, and restarters; 
(high-)growth businesses are provided with Ondernemingshuizen: these include 
business housing locations in which businesses can run their business and network, 
and/or one-stop shops were they can obtain information and advice support. Secondly 
and thirdly, the policy line involves facilitory and stimulatory measures with respect 
to entrepreneurship. The regional support coordination, the experimental projects 
aimed at underprivileged start-ups, the expertise center for foreign entrepreneurship, 
and the Ondernemershuizen constitute institutions that carry out the tasks that involve 
the political vision and the facilitory and stimulatory aspects of the policy: 
constitutory policy. The policy line can be characterized as policy using the rational 
approach although the political vision constitutes a cultural approach component in   24 
which shared meaning on the desirability of widespread attainability of 
entrepreneurship is promoted.  
The labor policy line, aimed at promoting entrepreneurship in general, 
predominantly consists of fiscal–and thus economic–instruments that constitute 
tactical policy to relieve businesses from government imposed taxation on labor, 
which hampers employment creation and the willingness of businesses to expand and 
grow. It constitutes redistributive policy as resulting lower labor costs leave money 
within the business, which would otherwise have flown to the government as taxation. 
Labor policy here also constitutes stimulatory policy as business expansion is 
promoted via tax reduction. The rational approach is taken. 
The finance policy line concerns internal and external finance instruments, 
which are economic instruments that constitute tactical policy distributing resources 
into the hands of nascent, starting, and incumbent SMEs. The policy line involves 
distributive, facilitory, and stimulatory political aspects, which are approached 
rationally: to promote entrepreneurship sec.  
For an overview of the program theory at the program level, see figure 3. 
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Werk door Ondernemen: Loan Guarantee and Establishment Act 
The note proposes policies that would create employment by entrepreneurship policy. 
The policies are categorized by means and target group, i.e. fiscal facilities, 
decreasing regulation, quality of entrepreneurship, labor, financing and 
entrepreneurship in general, start-ups, (high) growth businesses respectively.
37 The 
contexts of the policies are several perceived economic and social trends related to 
SMEs and entrepreneurship and the significance of SMEs for employment creation.
38 
  The policy makers observe an increased attention for entrepreneurship related 
to several societal, economic, and technological developments that led to increased 
opportunities for small-scale economic activities. 
  Societal individualization has led to changed consumer preference. Consumer 
demand has become more and more diversified and production markets have followed 
this trend. Small-scale production tends to be more flexible to meet diversified 
demand patterns. 
  Big business have increasingly withdrawn to core activities and outsourced 
production processes, which led to opportunities for new and incumbent SMEs. The 
integration within the structure of production, i.e. integration between bigger and 
smaller businesses has increased dramatically. 
  Western economies have evolved more and more into service economies. 
Services tend to be provided by smaller businesses than industrial production 
businesses, which have led to an increase in the number of SMEs. 
  Supply-wise, technology and especially automatization and information and 
communication technology that decrease in price set the stage for small-scale 
production and service provision. 
  The shortened life cycle of products has led to a relative increase of R&D 
costs, which has led to cooperation and scale enlargement. On the other hand the 
process from product development to product distribution has increasingly scattered 
in parts. Combined with globalization of capital, resources, labor, and knowledge 
SMEs are increasingly able to operate in a world market. 
 
In terms of employment creation SMEs have contributed much to the Dutch economy, 
as 50% of production and 58% of employment is accounted for by SMEs. SMEs as a 
group created more jobs than bigger businesses between 1986 and 1995. Start-ups 
create one-third of the new jobs, while of incumbent businesses create two-third of 
the new jobs. So-called Gazelles, i.e. high-growth businesses, create half of the jobs 
created by incumbents. 
  The policies are aimed at promoting business start-ups, assisting Gazelles to 
grow even more and faster, and providing facilities to stagnant incumbents in order to 
create more Gazelles. 
  If obstacles to starting up a business, growing an existing business are lifted 
the different groups of SMEs will be able to create more jobs than otherwise would 
have been the case. These obstacles involve five categories, related to the policy 
means. (1) Fiscal facilities to increase the rewards of successful entrepreneurship and 
to increase the capabilities of businesses to internally finance new activities and 
investments; (2) Reducing dynamism restricting rules and regulations related to 
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business start-up and business growth; (3) Increasing the quality of entrepreneurship 
by which the opportunities for the development of new products and markets will be 
better exploited; (4) Decreasing the costs and increasing the flexibility and quality of 




PTE analysis of the Loan Guarantee 
The loan guarantee facilities involve category (5) mentioned above. A thorough study 
of the note yields no behavioral mechanisms and warrants for the loan guarantee 
facility, i.e. the BBMKB. The note does mention that long term bank financing suffers 
from a lack of security, e.g. collateral, and incapacity of businesses to pay principal 
and interest in the first years. The BBMKB serves as a solution to the issue. However, 
the BBMKB as a loan guarantee facility is not always sufficient according to the 
policy makers.
40 Even when the BBMKB guarantees half of the loan, banks are 
sometimes not eager to take on the loan because businesses cannot provide securities. 
This restricts the financing possibilities for businesses.
41 For innovative businesses 
two-third of the principal will be guaranteed by the facility; the repay duration will be 
increased from 6 to 12 years, which decreases the repay burden; in the first three 
years there exists no obligation to repay the parts of the principal or interest. As the 
maximum principal of the loan guarantee is 1 million gulden and a relatively large 
share of the guarantees are maximum guarantees it reflects a constraint on the 
financing needs. The maximum loan guarantee will therefore be extended to 2 million 
gulden. 
  As observed earlier the policy documentation merely reports on the 
technicalities of the policy output. The causal link between the policy output and the 
policy outcome is simply taken for granted, while the desired policy outcome is not 
made explicit. Of course we can assume that because the BBMKB is placed in the 
financing category and the (high) growth target group it is assumed that the BBMKB 
promotes employment creation among (high) growth businesses, but the link is not 
documented, based on social science or made explicit. There are neither behavioral 
mechanisms nor warrants mentioned that link the policy output, i.e. the BBMKB as a 
government service for SMEs, with the policy outcome, i.e. more employment 
creation than otherwise would have been the case and economic growth. 
 
PTE analysis Establishment Act 
Reflections about changing the Establishment Act mainly involve category (2) and 
not category (3) of the categories mentioned above. This appears to be a policy 
theoretical shift as modernizing the Establishment Act aims fully at reducing 
restrictions for the dynamism of start-ups, the administrative burden, the Shop 
Closing Law, and deregulating areas in the Big Cities
42. 
  Just as regarding the Loan Guarantee, the policy theoretical variables within 
the policy output and between the policy output and policy outcome are made explicit 
but not linked with one another. The policy objective of modernizing the 
Establishment Act is to reduce the restrictive effect of rules and regulation on start-
ups, casu quo on market dynamism. 
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  Werk door Ondernemen reports on the modernization effort that involves a 
reevaluation of the quality of business start-ups and free entry.
43 Because the 
modernization effort involves negative policy, i.e. lifting rules and regulations 
altogether, it is easier to perceive the relationship between the policy output casu quo 
the Establishment Act and the policy outcome casu quo a business environment 
wherein business start-ups can more easily enter the market. But this does not mean 
that a policy-theoretic lacuna does not exist. 
 
2.5 De Ondernemende Samenleving (1999) 
The general policy theory thesis in De Ondernemende Samenleving implies that 
operationalized policy objectives A-C result in the values sought I-V (see figure 4), 
which constitutes a more entrepreneurial economy. Vis-à-vis other notes the policy 
theory is turned upside down, as the values sought now constitute the general policy 
objective: a more entrepreneurial society, which is defined as ‘fewer obstacles and 
more opportunities for entrepreneurship’. The causal relationship between policy and 
policy objectives is loosely assumed but not seen as a strict guideline. The 
quantifiable general economic policy objectives are implicitly put aside and more 
qualitative and less quantifiable values are perceived as the ultimate objective. 
  A policy maker interviewed for the present report noted that when policy 
adheres to these values economic growth, employment creation, and dynamism are a 
logical consequence. The policy note implicitly submits to the notion that it is 
impossible to predict precisely and quantitatively the consequences of (economic) 
policy. This approach flies in the face of the dominant interpretation and development 
toward public accountability, which de facto means that every ring in the logical 
chain of policy theory–both input and output–should be quantifiable and accounted 
for. 
   
The Good Market Order policy line addresses two historical pillars of Dutch 
regulation: the Establishment Act and the Bankruptcy Law. Regarding the 
Establishment Act the note proposes and schedules the partial and then complete 
abolishment of the Act in 2001 and 2007 respectively. It constitutes negative legal 
policy with an economic intention: to lift the adverse effects of obstacles to start-up a 
business. Analytically the abolishment initiatives involve a rational approach as the 
policy theory has shifted from positive to a negative effect on the economy as a whole. 
The institutional change involved should make the Dutch regulation framework–in 
general–more conducive for entrepreneurial activity both qua start-ups and high-
growth businesses. 
  The Bankruptcy Law has been a predominantly legal instrument, but as its 
economic effects seem to be unsatisfactory policy makers aim to amend the Law in a 
way that yields better economic effects. These more favorable economic 
consequences involve attaining more business transfers and continuations rather than 
bankruptcies.  
 
The Adequate Regulation policy line involves the so-called MDW
44 operation, which 
reviews new rules and regulations. The review constitutes an ex ante evaluation of 
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new rules and regulations qua effects on business and institutional framework and the 
manageability and feasibility from both a business compliance and policy execution 
perspective. The policy line involves legal, economic, and communicative 
instruments as the legal framework regarding business is reviewed and amended in 
order to diminish the negative effects of regulation compliance. Also the stimulation 
policies are streamlined in order to communicate more efficiently what businesses 
ought to comply to and what assistance business can obtain from government. In this 
manner the policy line is institutional and operational in nature as the rules of the 
game are amended and public agencies receive new instructions regarding regulation 
and compliance. This rational approach aims to promote entrepreneurial activity via 
less government monitoring and control. 
   
The Productive Economic Climate policy line involves six specific policy areas: 
finance and fiscal facilities, education, local and regional policy, new markets, fast 
growing businesses, and technology start-ups. The set-up of the policy note with the 
two previously discussed and the current policy line resembles the earlier distinction 
between integration and functional policy. 
  The policy line consists of policy instruments with legal, economic, and 
communicative aspects. The finance and fiscal facilities are predominantly economic 
instruments. The fiscal facilities promote capital accumulation, which makes 
businesses more eligible for loans. Secondly, the fiscal facilities promote investments 
with favorable depreciation possibilities, while tax reductions on R&D activities 
promote innovation. Thirdly, business transfer is fiscally encouraged, just as business 
mergers. Fourthly, a technology rating, which is a communicative instrument, is 
aimed to make the demand for capital more transparent. Fifthly, the Unemployment 
Assistance Credit facilitates business start-ups among the unemployed. Sixthly, 
Syntens focuses its operations on matching informal investors with (nascent) 
entrepreneurs. 
  Qua education policy communicative instruments are implemented in order to 
promote entrepreneurship as an alternative for wage employment. The local and 
regional policy efforts focus on the legal instruments, which hamper economic 
activity and business establishment. The new markets policy evolves around the 
promotion of export activities in which public agencies and commercial banks 
cooperate. A similar approach is conducted regarding high-growth businesses and 
technology (start-up) businesses; economic institutional instruments are put in place 
that involve a number of private and public parties, which coach and use network 
initiatives to provide these businesses with information, skills, and capital. The policy 
instruments regarding technology (start-up) businesses are applied at the regional 
level involves higher education institutions, Chambers of Commerce, Syntens, 
Regional Development Agencies. 
  All these instruments involve tactical policy distributing resources to the most 
valued ends; politically these instruments are facilitory and stimulatory with a rather 
rational approach as the policies reflect the assumed determinants of entrepreneurship. 

















De Ondernemende Samenleving: Loan Guarantee and Establishment Act 
The note addresses the social economic development of the past decades in which (1) 
entrepreneurship gained attention, (2) 90% of the Dutch population stands favorable 
with regard to entrepreneurship, and (3) more than 100 businesses are started daily. 
On the other hand, by international comparison the Dutch economy has relatively few 
start-ups, relatively few innovators, and relatively few growing businesses. 
Entrepreneurship is deemed important because it fosters flexibility and innovation, 
creates employment, promotes self-development, promotes social emancipation and 
integration, and can augment sustainable business. Three policy themes operationalize 
these desirable consequences of entrepreneurship: (1) market regulation, (2) 
regulation and public service provision, and (3) create more opportunities by means of 
a productive business climate.
45 
The Establishment Act is part of the first theme; the Loan Guarantee is part of 
the third theme. 
 
PTE analysis of the Loan Guarantee 
The policy makers state that they will increase SMEs’ possibilities of obtaining risk-
bearing capital by expanding the size of the guarantee fund and by developing a rating 
tool for the assessment of investment projects. 
  The note observes that bigger businesses can more easily finance their 
activities than smaller businesses because of (1) information asymmetry between 
financiers and small businesses and start-ups: the former cannot easily and cost-
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effectively determine the risk-reward profile of businesses without a track record or 
experience with external financing, the latter are often not experienced with external 
financing and do perceive the full potential of exploiting the capital market. (2) Small 
businesses need relatively little financing while the assessment and management costs 
of financers are relatively high. (3) Young businesses and (high) growing businesses 
often lack the collateral demanded by external financers.
46 
  Bank loans dominate SME financing partly because SMEs are not aware of 
alternative financing channels, want the application process to be quick, and do not 
want to lose independence (to e.g. private investors). While the unawareness of 
alternative channels of financing may not be a problem for most start-ups–because the 
alternatives simply do not exist or are unattractive–alternatives to bank financing are 
essential for seeders, techno start-ups, and gazelles.
47 
  Research shows that banks deny 13% of loan applications. Half of the 13% 
attain financing via alternative channels and get the loan they desired or more. One-
fourth ceased seeking alternative financing; the remaining one-fourth attained less 
external alternative financing than desired.
48 In our opinion this shows that despite 
natural financing barriers, the capital market works pretty well.
49 
  To promote SME financing, especially for start-ups, the Loan Guaranteed 
fund is increased in cooperation with the European Investment Fund (from 850 
million to 1 billion Guilders). 
 
PTE analysis of the Establishment Act 
The note states that by January 1, 2001 the Establishment Act and its resolutions will 
be withdrawn with the exception of health, environment, and safety requirements. 
These requirements will be put into law where after by January 1, 2006 the remainder 
of the Establishment Act will be abolished. 
  The January 1, 2001 decision is based on a 1998 evaluation of the Act
50, 
which concluded that it constitutes no effective, efficient, and necessary means to 
promote entrepreneurship quality both regarding business entry and among 
incumbents. Furthermore the abolishment of the Act would increase the amount of 
start-ups and dynamism without negative indirect consequences. 
  The continuation of the modernization of the Establishment Act in the form of 
abolishment concludes the shift in perception regarding the Act. The view that the Act 
is a necessary check on quantity and quality of new entrants has been replaced with 
the view that the dispersed costs of direct and indirect consequences of entry 
requirements are higher than the concentrated benefits. While the modernization 
efforts regarding the SME Instrumentarium were aimed at policy efficiency (input-
output), the abolishment of the entry requirements was aimed at policy effectiveness 
(output-outcome by taking away the input). 
  The warrants for the change in policy theory regarding the policy effects of the 
Establishment Act were based on an evaluation study, which theoretically studied the 
effects of the Act, the empirical effects of relaxing the entry requirements on business 
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entry, and the counterfactual effects if it would not have been in place. These 
observations seem plausible. 
 
2.6 In Actie voor Ondernemers (2003) 
In Actie voor Ondernemers focuses on relieving businesses of obstacles in the 
regulatory without the elaborate framework on how to attain an entrepreneurial 
society as in De Ondernemende Samenleving. Therefore 29 of the 43 ‘actions’ are 
policies that aim to influence the incentive structure of start-ups, incumbent SMEs 
whether they be (high-)growth, technology or innovative businesses, and businesses 
that are transferred or discontinued. 
  The central value of the note is more and better entrepreneurial activity; the 
norm–implying the way to connect the final relationship with the normative 
relationship–is a business climate in which less obstacles and rules and regulations 
exist vis-à-vis the status quo. In Actie voor Ondernemers has adopted the target group 
policy method, which had been introduced explicitly in Werk door Ondernemen: 
policy is aimed at start-ups; (high-)growth, technology, and innovative businesses; 
and businesses dealing with bankruptcy, discontinuation or transfer of ownership. 
Instead of De Ondernemende Samenleving’s more elaborate policy objectives 
associated with economic growth, employment creation, and dynamism In Actie voor 
Ondernemers targets these three general economic policy objectives more directly. 
  In Actie voor Ondernemen addresses the three target groups by seven action 
lines: three for start-ups, two for (high-)growth et al. businesses, and three for 
bankruptcy, discontinuation, and business transfer; start-ups and (high-)growth et al. 
businesses share one action line. 
  Start-ups are addressed by means of I. An entrepreneurial culture, II. Better 
position for start-ups, and III. Transparent rules, public service provision. 
Growth-businesses are addressed by means of I. Creating a better and safer business 
climate and II. Transparent rules, improved public service provision.  
Bankruptcy, business discontinuation and transfer are addressed by means of I. 
Facilitate business transfer; II. Improving procedures for debt restructuring; and III. 
To take away bottlenecks for family businesses. 
   
The start-up I. An entrepreneurial culture policy line contains communicative 
instruments that aim to improve the awareness of entrepreneurship as a viable 
alternative for employeeship under students of middle and higher education. It 
adheres mostly to the tactical policy category as resources are distributed to 
communicate with a specific group in society, i.e. students. Politically the policy line 
deals with the stimulation of awareness of certain knowledge, which should lead to 
particular behavior: more business start-ups among students than otherwise would 
have been the case. Analytically, the policy line is both rational and cultural qua 
approach; the objective is simply the promotion of entrepreneurship awareness among 
public education students and to create a shared meaning on the social economic 
importance of entrepreneurship by providing information and organizing promotion 
events. 
  The II. Better position for start-ups policy line contains economic instruments, 
which among other things aims to increase the availability of start-up capital, 
improving informal capital provision networks, ethnic entrepreneurship monitor 
report to be integrated in the Big City Policy, and instruments aimed to lift obstacles 
for technology and innovative start-ups. These policies constitute tactical policy as the   32 
distribution of resources is engineered in a way that facilitates start-ups. Politically, 
the policy line contains distributive, redistributive, and stimulatory aspects where 
respectively fiscal instruments, subsidies, and promotion of entrepreneurship are 
involved. Analytically, the rational approach is applied to the policy line: a mix of 
different instruments is aimed to create a better position for nascent entrepreneurs to 
act and start a business. 
  Thirdly, the III. Transparent rules, public service provision involves legal 
instruments, which aim to reduce the administrative burden; align the definition of 
entrepreneur among public agencies for social security and tax reasons; the 
improvement of information provision; and to give more attention to the government 
as a customer of SMEs. The first two instruments are legal instruments that aim to 
reduce or soften the grasp of the legal system upon businesses; the latter two 
instruments are economic instruments that aim to communicate entrepreneurship 
information and create equal opportunity for SMEs to gain the government as a 
customer respectively. The legal instruments constitute institutional policy that 
politically involves negative regulatory policy–changing the rules of the game in the 
favor of start-ups–while the economic instruments constitute tactical policy 
distributing resources in order to stimulate start-up SMEs. The objectives to 
deregulate and improve public service provision both when the government is the 
supplier and the consumer involve a rational approach. 
 
The Growth I. Creating a better and safer business climate policy line addresses 
doing business in general by aiming to create a better and safer business climate. 
Criminal activity regarding businesses and business areas is addressed. The 
availability of labor is addressed and international entrepreneurship, i.e. international 
trade, is stimulated. Investigations are set out to make the labor market more flexible. 
  The instruments are therefore both legal and economic as labor legislation is 
evaluated vis-à-vis the economic consequences of reforming the legislation, which 
makes it institutional policy. Politically the instruments are negative constitutory as 
institutions are reformed and agencies are lifted of enforcing certain laws. The 
instruments are rational in approach as the objective of making the labor market more 
flexible in order to streamline the labor aspects of doing business is taken head-on. 
The Growth II. Transparent rules, improved public service provision policy 
line concerns predominantly legal instruments as the administrative burden is 
addressed, the feasibility of rule-free business zones are studied and the policy makers 
investigate whether the BV legal structure (private limited liability company) can be 
simplified. These instruments involve institutional policy as the (legal) rules of the 
game are amended toward a more flexible and dynamic business climate. While the 
instruments are predominantly deregulatory in nature it also communicates a vision of 
a more deregulated economy, which signifies both the realization that it might be 
helpful for government to get out of the way of wealth creation by business and the 
notion that putting regulation into law backfires into a legal framework that cannot 
easily be retracted and might have unintended consequences related to the problem 
that allegedly had to be controlled. In that sense the instruments are also somewhat 
communicative in nature, which echoes the title and theme of the note: (practical) 
(observable and thus accountable) actions for entrepreneurs. Analytically the 
instruments are then both rational and cultural in nature; the objective is to alleviate 
the SME sector of (an economy-wide negative-sum game) unnecessary regulations in 
order to promote entrepreneurial activity, while at the same time the instruments   33 
communicate a shared meaning of rules and regulation and the economy among the 
government and the business sector. 
 
Bankruptcy, business discontinuation and transfer are firstly addressed by means of I. 
Facilitate business transfer, which predominantly concerns communicative policy in 
the economic casu quo preference, decision-making process, and information 
facilitory and stimulatory sphere. The instruments aim to increase awareness of latent 
entrepreneurs and incumbent businesses to the alternative of business transfer rather 
than starting-up or expanding a business. A toolkit is developed to inform and assist 
these entrepreneurs; additionally a report is prepared that covers the fiscal aspects of 
business transfers. Tactical policy seems to fit best, as resources are distributed 
toward informing and assisting latent entrepreneurs about business transfer as a viable 
alternative for starting-up or expanding a business. The policy is thus pretty 
straightforward rational qua approach with a cultural aspect of shared meaning on 
what SME business transfers might mean in a dynamic economy. 
Secondly bankruptcy, business discontinuation and transfer are addressed by 
means of II. Improving procedures for debt restructuring, which involves a policy 
instrument that deals with the improvement of the insolvency system. The policy 
instrument constitutes is an economic instrument with a legal background, which 
involves institutional policy aiming to improve the legal rules of the game regarding 
business insolvency. Politically, it is a regulatory instrument with a rational approach: 
streamline the insolvency system making it more conducive for wealth creation 
involving the interests and (proxy) property rights of the parties involved.  
Thirdly bankruptcy, business discontinuation and transfer are addressed by 
means of III. To take away bottlenecks for family businesses, which deals with 
networks, internationalization, and information provision regarding family businesses. 
Family businesses prove to be a stable wealth-creating factor in a developed economy. 
By means of the rationale, “promote what works,” the government aims to promote 
the activities of family businesses. The instruments are economic and tactical in 
nature and politically stimulatory. The objectives are as described and straightforward; 
it constitutes a nit bit of cultural policy as the instruments communicate the valuation 
of family businesses; to create a shared meaning on the phenomenon among 
government and the public. 
 






















Figure 5 Program Theory at the program level (2003) 
 
 
In Actie voor Ondernemers: Loan Guarantee and Establishment Act 
The note describes entrepreneurship as the mentality and the process by which in a 
new or existing organization economic activity is created and developed. It arises 
through a mix of: taking risks, creativity, innovation, and healthy management. 
Entrepreneurship exists in every sector and kind of business. The term applies to self-
employed and businesses of any size and in any stadium of the life cycle of a 
business.
51By increasing economic dynamism the cabinet tries to sustain and enhance 
the competitive power of the Dutch economy. Important criteria for entrepreneurship 
are the number of start-ups and the performance of incumbent businesses.
52 
Additional policy measures regarding the Loan Guarantee focuses on start-ups. 
The Establishment Act is not mentioned, as the two-step abolition process as 
described in De Ondernemende Samenleving has not changed. 
 
PTE analysis of the Loan Guarantee 
The note focuses on the start-up facility within the Loan Guarantee, which 
readdresses the obstacles regarding start-up financing. We can deduce that the 
obstacles regarding incumbent SME financing, including (high) growth businesses 
were considered less important in a Loan Guarantee context. Growth businesses were 
addressed via the Special Financing Arrangement that involved 79,411,000 Euro each 
year in the 2004-2007 period. 
  In order to promote external financing among start-ups via the Loan Guarantee 
facility, the policy makers dismiss the banks from the obligation to provide so-called 
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secondary securities with regard to start-up loans. This decreases the handling costs of 
loans less than 100,000 Euro. The measure should lead to an increase in the provision 
of start-up loans within the yearly Loan Guarantee budget, which had been 37% in the 
year 2002. 
The yearly Loan Guarantee budget remained at 1 billion Guilders, the total 
guaranteed fund involved 2.8 billion Guilders (1.3 billion Euro) in 2002. 
The policy makers do not explicitly point out, e.g. by means of behavioral 
mechanisms or warrants, how an increase of start-ups with a guaranteed loan will lead 
to sustainable economic growth and employment creation. This constitutes a policy 
theory lacuna. 
 
PTE analysis of the Establishment Act 
Remarkably, the Establishment Act is not mentioned in the note, but once. The 
bottleneck list created by EIM
53 states that the flexibilization of the establishment 
requirements resulted in a decrease in the quality level of entrepreneurship. Given the 
PTE analysis of the previous notes, and the assumption of consistency, this policy 
outcome probably would not be considered a bad thing. A decrease in the quality 
level of entrepreneurship constitutes a wider range of consumer choice, as goods and 
services of lower quality will be priced lower as well. When these low quality 
businesses survive this indicates a consumer demand for lower quality goods and 
services. Additionally, a decreasing quality of the average entrepreneur does not entail 
a decreasing quality of overall entrepreneurship, as the more flexible establishment 
requirements might lead to a wider distribution of entrepreneurial quality, i.e. more 
divergences from the average. Furthermore, while the flexibilization of the 
establishment resolution has resulted in a lower average in quality this does not take 
into account the gains yielded from unburdened successful entrepreneurs, which 
might not have been as successful when the original establishment requirement would 
still have been in place. To conclude, a lower quality in the average entrepreneur does 
not constitute a policy problem–at least with the policy theory regarding the 
Establishment Act of the early 2000s–that has to be overcome. 
  Still it would have been more prudent from a science-based policy perspective 
when the policy makers had reported on the progress of the two-step abolition of the 
Act. 
 
In part 3 we focus on the policy effects of the Establishment Act and the Loan 
Guarantee. First we describe and analyze general policy theory assumptions that 
relate to these two policy instruments. Then we analyze fiscal, financial, and 
deregulation policies. In section 3.4 we recapitulate the policy theory of the 
Establishment Act and the Loan Guarantee and apply the previous knowledge to the 
PTE of these policies. 
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3. A program view regarding the policy theory-policy effects 
relationship 
3.1 Introduction 
Here we discuss the policy assumptions that have been in place at the program level. 
We analyze these assumptions in a fashion that can be called an impact model 
analysis. First, we distinguish between three types of general policy theory 
assumptions. Next, we discuss the implied policy effects of a number of specific 
policy instruments from a theoretical perspective. Finally, we analyze the policy 
implications of two policies conducted in the 1982-2003 period, i.e. the Loan 
Guarantee Act and the (modernization and abolishment of the) Establishment Act.  
3.2Three types of general policy theory assumptions 
1. If statistical data shows that X leads to more Y and Z, then enhancing X with public 
policy will lead to even more Y and Z.
54 
 
This implies that policy makers think that promoting X via policy entails the same 
social mechanisms that emerge in the economy spontaneously. The policy makers 
often do not explicate the underlying social mechanisms and they do not seem to 
perceive qualitative difference between emergent social mechanisms and policy 
induced mechanisms. 
First, often one cannot determine whether the businesses that made use of a 
policy and because of that is able to start a business or pursue a new activity–such as 
R&D–would have been in the same position had the policy not existed. If this can be 
determined one can question whether the successful policy impact is in line with 
market conditions or that the start-up/new business activity constitutes overcoming 
policy related obstacles by putting public resources into overcoming obstacles that 
were funded with public resources; and thus constitutes double costs for society. 
Second, policy involves a selection problem that comes natural to market 
selection. Both policy and market selection involves intersubjective judgment. The 
difference is that the judgments involved in market selection are based on dispersed 
knowledge. Judgments involved in policy selection imply the centralization of 
knowledge, which cannot account for the specific contexts the judgment applies to. 
Furthermore, one cannot know whether the selection is in line with market conditions, 
it is unknowable. This is the case because the knowledge necessary for subjective 
judgment emerges from the market process itself. If one constructs a selection process 
that is outside the market, or (either implicitly or explicitly) tries to displace the 
market, one does not possess the knowledge to base judgment on. Of course one can 
approximate the necessary knowledge (like relative prices, interest rates, selection 
criteria et cetera), but this seems a useless enterprise because either the market can do 
it better (dispersed knowledge entails dispersed costs, costs for e.g. discovery) or 
there may be a reason why the market cannot provide–e.g. loans for certain start-ups 
or new business activities. 
Third, human action always involves indirect effects and consequences. So, 
policy involves indirect effects and consequences. The effects and consequences are 
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categorizes in chapter two where we described Mises’s categorization of 
interventionist policies. The social mechanism X ￿ Y, Z actually describes a two-
way causal relationship (which may or may not be temporary and accidental and even 
just a correlation). X refers to a quantitative or qualitative operationalization of human 
action, while Y and Z are the effects and consequences of X, which in their turn also 
influence X. Y and Z are both the direct and indirect results of X. 
 
The policies that are subject of the argument are subsidies, fiscal instruments, and 
specific exemptions on rules and regulations that apply to businesses in general. 
These policies influence the market selection of entrepreneurs; the supply of 
entrepreneurs will tend to be higher than otherwise would have been the case. 
  So-called positive policies can distort the selection of entrepreneurs and their 
performance in a way that constitutes a net loss for the economy at large. Positive 
policies add to the existent policy matrix; positive policies aim to countervail existent 
rules, regulations, or entry obstacles caused by policy. Positive policies can also 
involves adding interventions in order to enhance existing policies that are considered 
successful. Negative policies, which involve lifting obstacles for starting a business, 
existent business activity, and the judgment of future market conditions tend to 
involve a net profit for the economy. 
 
2. More X is always better than less X, or the X resulting spontaneously, because X 
leads to Y and Z, which we perceive as positive phenomena. 
 
This policy assumption pervades the policy theory through the period studied. If we 
conceive X as the number of incumbent SMEs, then the ultimate conclusion would be 
that the entire economy should consist of only SMEs. This does not seem consistent 
with the economies of scale and scope concept. Some goods and services can only be 
produced profitably by businesses that are larger than the average SME. We may also 
conceive X as the number of new business start-ups. 
  Alternatively, the policy assumption might imply that there exists and 
optimum of X, which is currently not in place. The first response to that statement 
would be: how would one know? Of course one can pinpoint a couple of industries 
where substantial concentration is in place, which is due to rules and regulations that 
favor or even specifically legally enforce the existence of big business in these 
industries. Certain parts of the financial sector come to mind here. The point then is to 
get rid of the rules and regulation and laws that cause these concentrations in order to 
give opportunity for new–to be discovered–suitable structures of production. The 
notion that one cannot know what the optimum is–taking pragmatic institutional 
obstacles out of the equation for a moment, a non-precisive abstraction–is hard for 
policy makers and economists to accept. But it seems to be that what Hayek said in 
the spirit of his friend Sir Karl Popper rings some truth (paraphrase): the valuable 
knowledge gained by science is not so much what could be known or happen, but 
what cannot possibly be known or happen. In other words, science is the enterprise of 
pursuing negative knowledge and thus to know more about what one cannot know; to 
point man to its ignorance and to use that as a starting-point for action. 
In absolute terms the number of start-ups was stagnating and in 1996 the 
number of start-ups was lower than in 1995. Additionally, the percentage of self-
employed relative to the total labor force in the Netherlands was still lower than in the 
UK and the US. Therefore, i.e. based on these facts, Economic Affairs perceived 
opportunities to exploit the growth potential of start-ups (and the favorable   38 
consequences associated with them). But this conclusion simply does not follow; the 
Netherlands is neither the UK nor the US. Except for the fact that the US and the UK 
are larger economies; the major economic activities entertained in the Netherlands are 
somewhat different than in the UK/US.   
Another response to the optimum hypothesis could be the question why the 
optimum does not emerge spontaneously. Secondarily, one could pinpoint the barriers 
and obstacles to the emergence of such an optimum. Some obstacles and barriers, 
although natural–i.e. the unintended result of human actions–can be lifted by policy. 
However one can immediately ask what the cost of the policy and its implementation 
is; policy can counterfactually displace the growth of existing business or the 
emergence of spontaneous start-ups (that are not the direct result of positive policy). 
 
When the proper institutions are in place there exists no objective criterion to value 
more X over less X when a certain amount of X is the result of this proper 
institutional make-up. One cannot imagine–actually great thinkers in economic 
thought could and led the way–how consumer demand and entrepreneurial discovery 
influences and indirectly–meaning not intentionally steered at the macro allocation 
level–directs the structure of production. As the 1982 WRR report points out, every 
existing business plays an important role in the structure of production for the single 
reason that it exists (and produces a positive return or cash flow). As North
55 points 
out: the more complex the economy, the more room for intermediary service 
providers that engage in coordination of economic activities. 
  Although X’s maybe handy to found or report policy success it does not mean 
that more X is always better than fewer X; or the other way around when X is valued 
negatively. 
 
Displacement as a result of public policy 
Public policy is the result of centralizing dispersed non-market knowledge, so public 
policy constitutes an intervention in the market process and therefore does not share 
the fundamental characteristic of dispersed adapted human action: aiming to discover 
and exploit changes in consumer demand. Public policy aimed at promoting and 
assisting start-ups and new business activities may result in an oversupply of certain 
entrepreneurial activities, which may displace on another. The costs of bankruptcy, 
which relates to the decrease in value of capital invested as a result of the 
misallocation of that capital, besides the costs of the policy and the change of the 
structure of production that influences the actions of other entrepreneurs result in a net 
loss for society. 
 
3. If X emerges spontaneously and is associated with Y (Y is valued positively), or Y 
is one of the characteristics of X, then it is good to promote more X. 
 
For example, so-called Gazelles (high-growth businesses) are associated with high 
employment creation. That is why in Werk door Ondernemen Economic Affairs aims 
to exploit the employment potential of Dutch SMEs by promoting the characteristics 
of Gazelles among existing Gazelles and potential Gazelles. One of these 
characteristics is R&D. In Werk door Ondernemen R&D promoting policies are 
proposed in order to create more Gazelles and consequently to create more 
employment. 
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The problem with this policy theory evolves around the assumption that the 
characteristics of Gazelles are causal properties of them being Gazelles. R&D could 
have been a factor but there are a lot of businesses that conduct R&D and do not 
emerge as Gazelles. This is the principle of silent evidence, i.e. we only perceive 
empirically what we perceive empirically; so when we perceive Gazelles we do not 
perceive empirically the businesses with comparable characteristics that did not 
emerge as Gazelles. 
Therefore it does not follow that promoting R&D in the SME sector promotes 
the emergence of Gazelles. This relates to the first general policy theory assumption. 
Additionally, both the Gazelle policy aimed at current Gazelles and the innovation 
and technology policies may be subject of the picking winner syndrome.
56 There are 
many policy debates how to promote and stimulate innovation, but we know very 
little under which conditions innovation flourishes. What are the basic issues to 
address qua designing innovation institutions in the private and public sector? An 
important approach to policy that is commonly adopted in policy issues today is the 
picking winners approach. The basic idea is that comparative advantage is not static, 
but dynamic and it changes continuously: technology changes and it changes as the 
economy changes. The private sector often criticized that it relies too much on 
existing resources today and not preparing us for resources, goods, and services of 
tomorrow. The basic innovation process basically looks a like this: 
 
1. Create; Patent 
2. De-Risk; Product 
3. Commercialize; Profit 
 
The innovation process confronts policy makers with two potential policy targets: 
picking winners or funding basic research. The latter involves the expansion of the 
front-end of product development (innovation), picking winners however funds 
innovations that have a reasonable chance of success (and does not aim to generate 
more potential ideas). They pick the end of the de-risking stage. Then it is identifiable. 
The private sector is ready to invest in products that are ready for market, or nearing 
the de-risking stage, venture capital firms will have alerted private sector to invest. 
Public investment should move to the beginning of de-risking stage, as there is 
uncertainty about the success of the product in the market. The success rate of 
inventions to innovations is very low. Society-wide, investing at the beginning of the 
de-risking stage is simply too risky. Private sector entrepreneurs are willing to invest 
in the beginning; but they are not risk takers in the sense of riding a bike of a cliff. 
They are knowledgeable about the conditions and believe to be able to overcome the 
pitfalls.  
The public sector has neither the same goals nor same information; they want 
to win the ‘innovation war’. However, they are not participants in the industries they 
invest in. When it seeks to pick winners, it has to base it on a different class of criteria 
to pick winners than the private sector depends upon. The government depends on 
experts. Who are viewed as experts: people that have been successful in the past. But 
the future does not depend upon who has been successful but upon who will be 
successful. And the future is highly uncertain. 
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While path dependency exists (i.e. that the past and the present influence the 
future), you still cannot predict the future winners. Picking winners is based on past 
winners, future winners however are always uncertain. 
 
Example: Internet search engines. The winners have been Yahoo, AltaVista, Lycos, 
and not Google. Google dominates the Internet search engine market with a business 
model that may not have amazed the public funders. What will happen in the future? 
Will Google always be the major player in the market? Who knows? It is essentially 
unpredictable. Questions like: "What features will they have, what will consumers 
want?", all evolve around the inherent uncertainty of the future in general and future 
market condition specifically. 
 
3.3Implied policy effects of specific policy instruments 
Fiscal facilities 
Fiscal facilities comprise several implied policy effects; firstly, more capital in the 
hand of the decision-makers entails greater potential that these resources are allocated 
in a productive manner. This is definitely a positive effect. However, when a fiscal 
facility is aimed at a specific economic or social group it might promote certain 
business activities vis-à-vis others if it is not a general fiscal facility. Potentially this 
can lead to a relative oversupply of the emergence of these economic activities or 
social groups. This is also the case when we non-precisively abstract from the general 
negative supply side effects of taxation. And likewise when we disregard the 
regularity associated with subsidies. Although tax reduction should not be equated to 
subsidies, relative tax inequality among economic or social groups not only might 
increase the number of these groups–this is the subsidy regularity–but might also give 
them an advantage over other groups. This may exactly be the intention of the policy, 
but one could wonder if it is desirable. One the one hand equal taxation might indeed 
harm some groups more than others–think of economies of scale or cost structure 
relative to the tax–but on the other hand a relative reallocation of capital might 
influence the structure of production in a way that is less productive in terms of 
wealth creation than otherwise would have been the case. 
In the case of a specific fiscal facility there might emerge an oversupply of 
certain entrepreneurship vis-à-vis what would otherwise have been the case and/or 
relative to what would be sufficient in the structure of production. The promotion of 
business start-ups and business dynamics–in the quantitative sense–in itself might fall 
in the trap of perfect competition–more suppliers leads to improved market 
competition–when it does not lift some specific obstacles for the groups at which the 
fiscal facility is aimed. 
Fiscal facilities increase the capital invested by the groups addressed by the 
fiscal policy, but the existent tax structure decreases capital invested than otherwise 
would have been the case. Additional tax deductions may increase the complexity of 
the tax framework and increase the costs of doing business through extra paperwork 
and hired accountants without immediate production benefits. The total of fiscal 
arrangements between the government and big(ger) businesses seem to outweigh the 
tax breaks directed to start-ups and SMEs; which results in less profitability for start-
ups and SMEs than otherwise would have been the case. 
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Financial policies 
Loan guarantees create more loans for small businesses than otherwise would have 
been the case. This may crowd out other loans, as loanable funds are always limited. 
An extension of the guaranteed principal by the government entices bank to take on 
more and riskier loans as less of the total principal are subject to losses for the banks. 
If the potential benefits are high enough this may crowd out other businesses that are 
not eligible for the Loan Guarantee program. 
SMEs and start-ups may tend to become less integrated in the market for 
loanable funds and credit than otherwise would be the case. This may influence their 
survival rate. 
Interest reductions may entice start-ups and SMEs to take more risk than 
otherwise would have been the case. The risk taken may not be suitable for current 
market conditions and can influence the survival rate when the interest reduction is 
lifted. The supply of risk-taking start-ups will tend to be higher than otherwise would 
have been the case. The policy aspect may increase a selection bias for start-ups and 
SMEs barely surviving with the interest reduction, but they will fail when they do not 
qualify anymore for the interest reduction. 
 
Deregulation policies 
Deregulation policies aim to reduce formal economic rules that have a legal character. 
Deregulation can be targeted at market regulations and compliance regulation, which 
relates to administrative compliance such as legal compliance or tax compliance. The 
rationale behind deregulation policy is the notion that the costs of market regulations 
and compliance regulation for society and the businesses that are subject of the 
regulations might be more than it the benefits. As resources are scarce and when 
resources are being spend on regulations they cannot be spend on something else, 
such as business activities.  
A self-employed businessman who spends one day a week on regulation 
(compliance) cannot spend it on his business; a larger small or medium-sized business 
that employs people that deal with regulation cannot spend these labor resources for 
the production of its goods and/or services. So when these regulations are determined 
as unnecessary, ineffective they do not serve the common good the government 
initially perceived to realize with the regulation. They then constitute a cost for both 
the economy and society as more productivity and wealth are traded for the existence 
of cumbersome regulations. 
 
The argument that a loss of jobs and revenue in the regulation-related industry 
constitutes a loss in economic productivity is invalid, as this industry produces 
nothing valuable when the regulations do not realize any social or economic good. 
The industry’s ‘productivity’ then merely represents a cost for the economy, i.e. the 
businesses subject of the regulations, and for society. Employing these resources into 
other economic activities adds to the productive goods and services produced in an 
economy. 
Regulations of an administrative nature tend to unintentionally favor 
businesses that can obtain economies of scale in compliance. Bigger businesses tend 
to acquire these economies of scale rather than small(er) businesses. As the 
administrative burden often constitutes to some degree a lump sum of constant costs 
this might lead to the mechanism that small(er) businesses are relatively less capable 
to compete with big(ger) businesses than otherwise would have been the case.   42 
Additionally, this might lead to a lower growth rate of small(er) businesses, which 
then might constitute some sort of glass ceiling. 
  Regulations that apply only to big(ger) business, which have adapted a way of 
dealing with the regulations efficiently might constitute an obstacle for small(er) 
businesses to grow. 
 
Regulations should always be analyzed in advance for their utility to a common, 
public or economic good; additionally the potential differentiation of the impact 
between small(er) and big(ger) businesses should be analyzed as well as between 
(sub)industries. 
  Political and special-interest favoritism and rent-seeking are always just 
around the corner when important and complex economic issues are raised and new 
regulations are proposed. In a sense the Establishment Act worked out as a legal 
institutional framework that favored incumbent SMEs vis-à-vis (small) entrants and 
protected businesses from one industry from another which might have had 
discovered synergy between economic activities that were legally separated by 
establishment resolutions. 
 
Entrepreneurial culture, education, information and advice provision policies 
Here we discuss the implied policy effects of the entrepreneurial culture, education, 
and information and advice provision policies in a combined fashion. In the 1980s 
entrepreneurship promotion, entrepreneurship education, entrepreneurship in public 
education, and the information and advice facilities were treated in a combined 
fashion as well, while in the late 1990s when the policy efforts regarding 
entrepreneurial culture promotion and entrepreneurship as a subject in public 
education began to intensify the policy lines somewhat diverged. In the end the 
policies all target the entrepreneurial function via the provision of knowledge and 
skills among potential and nascent entrepreneurs and incumbent entrepreneurs and 
start-ups respectively, which explains the conceptual distinction. 
  Combined the policies all aim to alleviate the negative supply side effects of 
past and present institutional frameworks that hamper entrepreneurial initiatives. On 
the one hand the Establishment Act and other rules and regulations hampered 
entrepreneurship both as real barriers but also as cognitive barriers. Perceived 
complexity with regard to starting a business not merely constitute barriers to 
entrepreneurial activities when a person investigates whether he or she would like to 
start a business, it also constitutes perceptional barriers that result from a stable 
institutional framework that was not conducive for allowing such activities. 
The policies mentioned in theory are a positive for the alleviation of the 
negative effects of the regulatory framework and an education system, which lags 
behind market demand, as the economy became more entrepreneurial rather than 
managerial.  But the policy initiatives in combination with institutional reform–of 
rules and regulation–constitutes program coherency. On itself the policies are a 
positive for entrepreneurship as these policies provide knowledge and skills that 
maybe only have come to the recipients indirectly or not at all. However, the link 
between the policy (the final relationship) and the causal mechanisms that more skills 
and knowledge would lead to more successful entrepreneurship is not that clear-cut. It 
seems to be the case that the link between entrepreneurship education and 
entrepreneurship is insignificant, the link between the education and performance is 
positive, but that the effect on earning is smaller for entrepreneurs than for   43 
employees.
57 Entrepreneurial foresight seems not to be a skill that is learned, but a 
talent that involves tacit knowledge and skills. 
Additionally, these policies provide information, knowledge, and skills to the 
broader population and specific groups, but this does not mean that these things will 
be used. More information, knowledge, and skills do not necessarily lead to the 
exploitation of these things. The effect may even be negative.
58 
This can be explained with the notion that entrepreneurs are not necessarily 
successful because they have more information or knowledge than another 
entrepreneur. Successful entrepreneurship seems to be the result of qualitative 
interpretations of situational factors and internal application of resources. These 
interpretations are above all interpretations, not objective givens, which perfectly 
illustrates the essence of entrepreneurship. More knowledge and information provided 
can actually cloud the interpretation of entrepreneurs before they have started their 
activities. More information and knowledge can reveal complexity of economic life of 
which the entrepreneur had not been aware of before.  
These policies however have (had) their role of alleviating the negative supply 
side effects and they are a valuable addition to the institutional reforms, which 
broadens the discretionary power of entrepreneurs rather than influence them in a 
more direct fashion. 
3.4 A specific policy instrument view regarding the policy theory-policy effects 
relationship 
Next we analyze the policy implications of the policies conducted in the 1982-2003 
period. We engage entrepreneurship theory; institutional theory; interventionism, 
market process, and supply-demand theory in this analysis. Then we discuss some 
evaluation criteria, which thereafter are applied to the analysis. 
 
The Loan Guarantee 
Recapitulation: the PT of the Loan Guarantee 
Start-up Note/MKB-beleid in Hoofdlijnen 
Pre-1982 policy assumptions 
•  Potential start-ups, including unemployed, lack savings for internal financing or 
lack securities for external financing. Additionally, there are markets that have 
overcapacity or undercapacity (policy content). 
 
•  When start-ups are excluded from the credit and loan market a public loan facility 
should be in place (policy content). 
 
•  Promoting start-ups in this manner (policy output)–sidestepping the conventional 
credit and loan market–is a good thing for the economy, i.e. for employment and 
economic growth (policy outcome). 
 
Post-1982 policy assumptions 
•  Market opportunity research leads to more efficient business entry as the 
government can intelligently restrict or promote entry in specific industries 
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(policy output), which will optimize economic growth and employment creation 
(policy outcome). 
 
•  The policy effectiveness of the KMKB is threatened by the lengthiness of the 
application procedure combined with a strongly increased demand for the facility 
(policy intput-policy output, policy output-policy outcome).  
 
•  The quantity of policy output–i.e. additional credit and loan provision than 
otherwise would have been the case, is threatened (policy input-policy output), 
which restricts the policy outcome–i.e. additional viable businesses than otherwise 
would have been the case (undesired policy outcome). 
 
Ruim Baan voor Ondernemen 
Changes and additions to policy theory 
•  Moving the facility entirely to the commercial bank will increase policy efficiency, 
as procedures will become less burdensome and lengthy, which will increase 
business start-up and incumbent financing (policy outcome), which will in its 
place lead to more economic growth and employment creation (policy outcome). 
 
 
Werk door Ondernemen 
Changes and additions to policy theory 
•  The BBMKB serves as a solution to the issue of long term bank financing 
suffering from a lack of security, e.g. collateral, and incapacity of businesses to 
pay principal and interest in the first years (policy output, policy outcome). 
•  For innovative businesses two-third of the principal will be guaranteed by the 
facility; the repay duration will be increased from 6 to 12 years, which decreases 
the repay burden; in the first three years there exists no obligation to repay the 
parts of the principal or interest (policy output). This will promote innovative 
business activities aligned with the general policy objectives (policy outcome). 
 
De Ondernemende Samenleving 
Changes and additions to policy theory 
•  Three factors influence external small business financing: (1) information 
asymmetry between financiers and small businesses and start-ups: the former 
cannot easily and cost-effectively determine the risk-reward profile of businesses 
without a track record or experience with external financing, the latter are often 
not experienced with external financing and do perceive the full potential of 
exploiting the capital market. (2) Small businesses need relatively little financing 
while the assessment and management costs of financers are relatively high. (3) 
Young businesses and (high) growing businesses often lack the collateral 
demanded by external financers (policy content). 
•  Therefore the size of the guarantee fund will be expanded and a rating tool for the 
assessment of investment projects will be developed (policy input-policy output). 
 
In Actie voor Ondernemers 
Changes and additions to policy theory 
•  In order to promote external financing among start-ups via the Loan Guarantee 
facility (policy output), the policy makers dismiss the banks from the obligation to 
provide so-called secondary securities with regard to start-up loans (policy output).    45 
•  This decreases the handling costs of loans less than 100,000 Euro (policy output).  
•  The measure should lead to an increase in the provision of start-up loans within 
the yearly Loan Guarantee budget, which had been 37% in the year 2002 (policy 
outcome). 
 
In the 1982-2003 period the goal of the Loan Guarantee has been providing access to 
external capital for start-up or incumbent SMEs with insufficient collateral and track 
record to obtain regular loans. The government guarantees a certain portion of the 
loan’s principal sum and borrowers obtain a lower interest, a more favorable 
repayment schedule et cetera. In the mentioned period policy efforts were aimed at 
increasing the efficiency of the Loan Guarantee by means of cutting out SME 
Instrumentarium related institutions and carrying out the policy via the commercial 
banks. This increased the total output of the Loan Guarantee, i.e. the total loans 
provided by commercials banks to SMEs within the Loan Guarantee framework. 
From this perspective the Loan Guarantee contributed to the policy objective of 
increasing the start-up rate and business activity among SMEs than otherwise would 
have been the case, as these start-ups and SMEs probably would not have gotten 
finance outside the commercial banking system. 
Additionally, the successful provision of capital to these SMEs may have 
increased entrepreneurial discovery and market dynamism, which are reciprocal 
processes. The consecutive extensions of the Loan Guarantee in the mentioned period 
are consistent with the policy objective of further increasing market dynamism in a 
business environment that was gradually relieved with the entry barriers of the 
Establishment Act. 
 
The guaranteed portion of the loan principle sum and the lower interest paid imply 
certain counterfactual states of the world which can be deducted into implied policy 
effects of the Loan Guarantee. 
  For one thing, the Loan Guarantee may constitute an increase in the total 
outstanding loans and credit facilities in the economy, specifically for SMEs. This 
might cause an oversupply of entrepreneurship. As an alternative system of loan 
provision is not in place, we cannot know whether that system would supply as much 
or more loans as low-hanging fruit might also be supplied by the financial system. 
  Secondly the Loan Guarantee may constitute a misallocation of loans to the 
consumers of the policy. In a bottom-up loan supply system where supply and 
demand come together in an organic manner–which of course does not mean that no 
intermediary institutions exist, such as banks, (angel) investment networks, friend and 
family relations–borrowers are selected in a manner where they proactively aim to 
obtain the loan. In a (sub) system where a Loan Guarantee is place, via the principle 
of silent evidence, it may meet a rather selective group of nascent entrepreneurs. This 
observation in no ways means to imply that the Loan Guarantee only attracts the 
rejected nascent entrepreneurs; however, it does imply that it may attract nascent 
entrepreneurs that are not necessary from a structure of production-consumer demand 
perspective. Of course it is possible that a rejected but innovative nascent 
entrepreneur submits for the Loan Guarantee and will be the next TomTom; that is 
totally inside the sphere of possibility. However, it is highly unlikely that in an open 
supply-demand driven loanable funds market this next TomTom with his or her 
farfetched fata morgana would not have been picked up. 
  This leads to the notion that the Loan Guarantee could effectively be a subsidy 
scheme that transfers wealth from existing or aspiring businesses to businesses   46 
receiving the guaranteed loan. If tax money is being used to fund businesses that 
create less wealth–that is both monetary and non-monetary–than otherwise would 
have been created with the funds this effectively constitutes a wealth transfer. When 
the Loan Guarantee is extended in times of economic decline and the guarantees are 
granted to businesses of which one cannot really determine whether they are insolvent 
or illiquid it might be the case that the extension constitutes so-called throwing good 
money after bad. 
  While one can contend that the Loan Guarantee only involves one billion 
Euros a year, which is negligible compared to the total loanable funds market and 
economy as a whole, it still might divert and displace nascent and incumbent 
entrepreneurs. Given this, it is important that the government aims to take out all 
barriers that limit the supply and demand of loanable funds and the easiness in which 
supply and demand meet. 
When banks assess that a business proposal is suitable for a loan, a guarantee 
from the government does not seem necessary. When banks will only assign a loan 
with an additional government guarantee it is reasonable to expect that the loan will 
probably only be profitable, i.e. will be repaid, when the government will step in. 
However, the little information we found regarding the government effectively paying 
out the guaranteed parts of loans points to the conclusion that not much money is lost 
on the Loan Guarantee facility. This begs the question whether the facility as a whole 
adds to societal wealth. Some policy makers noted that banks might use the 
guarantees as an additional security on their loans, which implies moral hazard in the 
use of the Loan Guarantee.  
 
The Establishment Act 
Recapitulation: the PT of the Establishment Act 
Start-up Note/MKB-beleid in Hoofdlijnen 
Pre-1982 policy assumptions 
•  The Establishment Act was introduced in 1934 as a result of the Great Depression, 
which involved a large inflow of unemployed.  
•  The unrestricted inflow of self-employed into the SME sector led to unfair 
competition and low quality goods and services as these entrants were poorly 
prepared and some were moonlighters. 
•  Entry requirements set into establishment resolution regarding general business 
knowledge, occupational knowledge and skills, and creditworthiness (policy 
output) is expected to result in more capable, rational, and efficient start-ups and 
expanding businesses (policy outcome). 
•  Entry requirements set into establishment resolution regarding general business 
knowledge, occupational knowledge and skills, and creditworthiness (policy 
output), would secure the stability of the SME sector as well as secure minimum 
quality levels of goods and service provided by SMEs from the supply side, and 
secure the social cohesion function of Dutch SMEs (policy outcome). 
 
Post-1982 policy assumptions 
•  A research program that monitors the opportunities in different industries 
(additional policy output), can manage business entry relative to the carrying 
capacity of the industry, which leads to a more optimal level of economic growth 
and employment creation by SMEs (policy outcome). 
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Ruim Baan voor Ondernemen 
Changes and additions to policy theory 
•  The effectiveness of the Establishment Act, i.e. the relationship between policy 
output and policy outcome, may not be optimal as the complex of establishment 
resolutions may hamper healthy economic growth. 
•  The net economic benefits of the Establishment Act are uncertain (policy 
outcome). 
•  Therefore the Establishment Act should be simplified as decided in the Cabinet 
Agreement, but an ultimate decision between keeping the Act as-is, simplification 
or abolishment will be based on the 1988 evaluation. 
•  More global and less extensive establishment resolutions (policy content toward 
improving policy outcome) would provide entrepreneurs more opportunities for 
development (enhances desired policy outcome). 
 
Werk door Ondernemen 
Changes and additions to policy theory 
•  The modernization, i.e. simplification, of the Establishment Act (policy output) is 
considered a form of deregulation, which will enhance entrepreneurial activity 
casu quo market dynamism (policy outcome).  
•  This will create net economic growth and employment creation (policy outcome). 
 
De Ondernemende Samenleving 
Changes and additions to policy theory 
•  While government policy has been aimed to create more room for 
entrepreneurship extant rules and regulations (policy output) can still hamper 
competitive market entry and thereby unnecessarily protect vested interests 
(undesired policy outcome). 
•  The Act does not constitute an effective, efficient or necessary means to promote 
entrepreneurial quality among start-ups or incumbents (input-output, input-
outcome, output-outcome). 
•  The abolishment of the Act (no policy output) will increase the amount of start-
ups and market dynamism (output without policy/policy outcome), which is 
associated with economic growth, employment creation, and economic dynamism 
(policy outcome). 
•  Substituting law compliance with entry requirements will enhance SME policy 
efficiency (input-output, input-outcome) 
 
In Actie voor Ondernemers 
Changes and additions to policy theory 
•  The Establishment Act is not mentioned in the note, but once in the bottleneck list 
created by EIM
59, which states that the flexibilization of the establishment 
requirements resulted in a decrease in the quality level of entrepreneurship. 
 
Discontinuing a law that sets requirements for start-up a business and entering a 
market logically leads to more start-ups. This is the case because as the costs 
(monetary and non-monetary) of starting-up a business decline, the effort of starting-
up a business enters in more people’s preference list than otherwise would be the case. 
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Additionally, the establishment resolutions were sometimes very 
compartmentalized in the sense that an applicant should comply with several 
establishment resolutions to be allowed to operate his business. This obviously 
limited economies of synergy and diversification. On the surface it might not make 
sense that a shoe repair shop also duplicates keys and sells post cards; in practice this 
seems to work pretty well so in the case when the establishment resolution framework 
would prohibit such a combination of services wealth and efficiency is lost. 
 
Instead of the government, or actually the industry organizations via the Social 
Economic Council via Economic Affairs and so forth, setting up establishment 
resolutions the discontinuation of the Establishment Act leaves this function out in the 
open for consumers individually, consumer organizations, certification organizations, 
employer associations to grasp. It may take some time, but as the function is carried 
out less centralized and stripped of special interests the quality of entrepreneurship 
maybe able to reach levels beyond the Establishment Act levels. Environmental and 
health laws are upheld in a compliance and monitoring fashion, i.e. businesses have to 
comply with these laws and are checked by government agencies, but these laws are 
not criteria for business entry anymore. 
  Additionally, the organic and emergent carrying out of the business quality 
function is subject to competition; one could think of consumer organizations. This 
market tends to improve the quality of carrying out the function itself. Furthermore, 
bottom-up monitoring of quality of businesses and entrepreneurship has the secondary 
consequence that it keeps incumbent businesses resilient.   49 
 
4. Findings and conclusions 
In the last 30 years–roughly 1983-2011–a spectacular rise in entrepreneurial activity 
occurred in the Dutch economy: the number of self-employed entrepreneurs rose from 
0.5 million in 1983 to almost 1.1 million in 2010 (EIM, 2011). As a percentage of the 
labor population entrepreneurs constituted 8% in the mid-1980s and 12% in 2010. 
Increased business entry caused this rise in the rate of entrepreneurship. Also the total 
stock of businesses has risen dramatically in the 30-year period, and according to the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2010 the Netherlands now occupies first place qua 
early-stage entrepreneurship in the EU-15 (Hartog et al., 2011) . 
  The number of self-employed without employees (ZZP-ers) has increased 
from 400,000 in 1996 to 640,000 in 2008. ZZP-ers constitute 70% of the total self-
employed entrepreneurs. While ZZP-ers are an immensely heterogeneous bunch their 
increase vis-à-vis the self-employed and the total businesses stock signifies the 
increased importance of ZZP-ers for the Dutch economy, illustrating its 
entrepreneurial flexibility and dynamism. 
  Qua employment creation SMEs have been the major contributors; new 
business entry and discontinuation have had a net positive effect on total employment. 
Between 1994 and 2004 SMEs were the major contributor to employment creation by 
incumbent businesses. The relative importance of new business entry in the 
employment creation of SMEs has increased. Because high-growth businesses are 
often younger than 15 years, the decrease of the age of the average business and SME 
implies future employment creation–although comparatively Dutch SME start-ups are 
less likely to become high-growth businesses. 
  The causes of the development toward more entrepreneurship lie in the 
dispersion of the use of ICT, which dissolves the boundaries between businesses and 
provides economies of scale to smaller businesses. Secondly, the service sector has 
grown dramatically, which is associated with smaller businesses and lower (internal 
and external) entry barriers. Additionally niche markets have increased, the 
differentiation of consumer demand favors smaller business structures that tend to be 
more flexible and adaptive and are easier to discontinue when the niche dissolves. 
From a supply-side perspective toward entrepreneurship the perception of 
entrepreneurship has become more favorable over the years; becoming an 
entrepreneur has become a part of the aspirations of people. Immigration has added to 
the rate of entrepreneurship as immigrants are more likely to start-up a business and 
become self-employed–as a result of culture and practical obstacles to enter the labor 
market as a newcomer qua education, language, culture et cetera. Additionally, the 
emancipation of the individual had led to an increased demand for autonomy from 
hierarchy and as a way to better combine work and care tasks. The demand and 
supply-side perspectives constitute the concept of the Entrepreneurial Economy, 
which has been facilitated by government policy both by getting out of the way–think 
Establishment Act–and by providing entrepreneurship facilities qua taxation, loan 
guarantees and education. 
 
There exists a strong qualitative correlation between the shift toward offensive 
entrepreneurship policy and the increase of the business ownership rate qua self-
employed without employees (ZZP-ers), increased business dynamics, and   50 
employment capacity of SMEs.
60 Our policy effect analysis implies that especially the 
gradual abolishment of the Establishment Act has contributed to this development. 
Fiscal facilities and financing policies such as the Loan Guarantee contributed to the 
promotion of economic activity in smaller business set-ups, which within the trend of 
more intricate structures of production probably has contributed to efficiency and 
economic growth. As these more intricate structures of production are more 
vulnerable for exogenous shocks–say failure of fiat currency unions, government debt 
systems, and financial systems–governments should on a more general level consider 
the influence of public policy and policy failure on the fragility of highly integrated 
economies. 
 
While a definite causal relationship cannot be proven, the policy shift probably did 
contribute to a definite change in perception of the public regarding the value of 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship as a valuable alternative to wage employment. 
The policy program probably has both caused and anticipated the increased desire for 
personal growth of the individual by means of autonomous pursuits, the perception of 
working life as a valuable end in itself rather than merely a means to put bread on the 
table, and the exploitation of economic activity outside traditional welfare systems. 
Regarding the last phenomenon, government policy could promote entrepreneurship 
by lowering the costs of choosing for alternative insurance and social security systems. 
  As the emergence of ZZP-ers can be perceived as an autonomous phenomenon 
–more ZZP-ers does not necessarily constitute more effective and efficient economic 
production–it can at least partly be explained by extant rigid labor market regulation. 
Increased labor market flexibility may entail a more efficient and effective allocation 
of both labor and capital. As tacit and specialized knowledge constitutes one of the 
most important ingredients of modern economies, initiatives to better integrate 
knowledge producing institutions with the rest of the economy should remain one of 
the main objectives of government policy. Also here, deregulation has an important 
role to play. 
 
In this report, we focused on the policy effects of the shifts in the Dutch SME and 
Entrepreneurship Program during the period 1982-2003, both at the program level and 
at the level of specific policy instruments. In this section we restate the research 
questions and answer them using a selection of the findings presented above. 
 
￿  Which (implicit) policy assumptions (i.e., the policy theory) have existed to justify 
the means (i.e. the Establishment Act and the Loan Guarantee) vis-à-vis the ends 
sought (i.e. sustainable development of the SME sector and financing viable new 
and existing business activities)? 
 
￿  Which policy effects do these (implicit) assumptions imply and to which extent are 
these policy effects consistent with the formal policy objectives, i.e. ends sought? 
 
Generally, the policy assumptions underlying the policy means are clear-cut. More 
market and less government underlie the policies. The operationalization has been 
described extensively above. 
  The causes of more entrepreneurship and favorable outcomes such as 
economic growth, employment creation, and dynamism are addressed either by the 
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dictum “less is better,” or, “more is better.” Fewer obstacles for business and the start-
up of new business (activities) are better than more obstacles. And more 
entrepreneurship is better than less entrepreneurship. The reform of the institutional 
framework casu quo SME Instrumentarium casu quo Establishment Act addressed the 
cause of fewer obstacles for business, which was also illustrated by the reduction of 
the administrative burden and compliance costs for small(er) businesses. The 
reduction of the tax burden for SMEs and specifically start-ups addresses the time 
preference of entrepreneurs as well as the quantity of resources to be allocated by 
entrepreneurs. The Loan Guarantee addresses natural obstacles of finance, as well as 
market failure in the sense of a loanable funds market that seems to favor big(ger) 
business, as the fixed costs of a loan to a small business proved to be higher than the 
revenue. Cultural, education, and information and advice provision policies address 
the (past) negative supply side effects of the institutional framework; the more 
information on entrepreneurial opportunities, the more skills learned, and advice 
given the more entrepreneurs will be successful. 
  Labor market policy seems to hamper entrepreneurial activity and is least 
coherent with the SME and Entrepreneurship policy program; labor market 
flexibilization currently–2011–still is an issue to which the implementation is 
hampered by lack of political agreement. The inter-ministry commissions with regard 
to administrative burden, taxation, and education illustrate a high degree of coherency 
of general government policy with regard to SMEs and entrepreneurship. 
 
Establishment Act 
The abolition of the Establishment Act resulted in a business environment more 
conducive for start-ups. Therefore entrepreneurial activities can flourish more than 
otherwise would have been the case. Start-ups now almost completely rely on 
consumer preference–except for some business compliance regulations and an 
administrative burden that still is subject to economies of scale in administrative 
compliance. Incumbent SMEs experience more competition than otherwise would 
have been the case. Therefore more dynamic efficiency is in place as incumbents also 
compete with nascent entrepreneurs, which have not yet entered the market but could 
enter rather easily–of course when we non-precisively abstract from natural obstacles 
such as entrepreneurial foresight, skills, knowledge, and resources to be invested. 
That the abolition of the Establishment Act has been a positive development for 
entrepreneurship is a crystal clear case. 
   
 
Loan Guarantee 
The Loan Guarantee as such constitutes more loans and credits for SMEs than 
otherwise would have been the case. The facility constituted €356 million in 
guarantees in 2002 and €1.3 billion in total; Economic Affairs had to pay €12.1 
million in claims to the banks and received €10.7 million in provisions. We conclude 
from this that the Loan Guarantee cost Economic Affairs €1.4 million in 2002, which 
is 0.11% of the total guaranteed principles. 
The average guaranteed loan increased over the years, which is due to a 
reduction in guaranteed loans under €70,000. This might constitute an increase of 
risk-averse behavior of the banks or an increase in fixed costs, which excludes small 
loans being profitable and thus excludes small businesses from being approved. 
Whether the Loan Guarantee constitutes a net benefit for the economy is hard 
to determine as one cannot know what the 67,000 start-ups (in 2002) that were   52 
approved a start-up guarantee would have produced as employees. Additionally it is 
hard to say whether the 164,000 that were approved an ordinary guarantee would 
have produced when they would not have obtained the guarantee. Would they have 
had to discontinue the business? And if so, would the assets have been transferred to 
another business that would have directed the assets to more productive ends? These 
are all counterfactual hypotheses that are relevant, but make any quantitative outcome 
benefits hard to determine. 
  We do know with certainty that the Loan Guarantee as such might displace 
other possible ways of financing a start-up or activities of an incumbent SME, 
including market solutions that circumvent the big commercial banks. Additionally, 
the total guaranteed principle sum constitutes more SME activity than otherwise 
would have been the case. Whether this also constitutes an overabundance in SME 
activity displacing employeeship (in which these loan applicants might be more 
productive) is hard to determine. 
  The interest deduction within the Loan Guarantee might induce laziness 
among applicants of the facility. Although the deduction is temporary and the parties 
are mutually aware of the pay structure, the artificial stimulus might induce more 
risky behavior by the loan applicant. As these interests are not paid, and the 
guaranteed sum has to be reserved by the government, the opportunity costs also 
should be considered when determining the costs and benefits of the facility.  
 
Which policy objectives were being addressed? 
As discussed above the policy objectives largely refer to output objectives and much 
less or merely implicitly to outcome objectives like economic growth, employment 
creation, and dynamism. An exception is the abolition of the Establishment Act, 
which was meant to increase business dynamics. The Trend Study (EIM, 2011) shows 
that this has been achieved, and our coverage of the implied policy effects of the 
Establishment Act determined that this increase is strongly linked with the policy. 
  The Loan Guarantee aims to solve natural obstacles in the loanable funds 
market, which then should lead to productive and employment creating businesses. It 
remains the question whether the Loan Guarantee constitutes a net gain for society 
and the economy, but the expenditure vis-à-vis the total loans guaranteed suggests 
that–if so–it would not constitute a large net loss. However, it is hard to determine 
what the displacement of funds from alternative policy objectives would have yielded 
vis-à-vis the funding of the SMEs that use the Guarantee.   53 
 





1982a: Income policy 
1982a: Price policy 
1982a: Fiscal policy (general) 
  1987: Social economic and fiscal policy 
  1995: Fiscal policy aimed at reducing profit and investment taxation and cost of labor 
 
1982a: Social policy 
1982a: Zoning policy 
  1987: Support structure 
1987: Regional policy regarding establishment permits 
1999: Regional and local policy with regard to business housing, information and advice 
provision, and business networks. 
 
1987: Informal economy 
1987: Self-employment policy 
1987, 1995: Deregulation 
  1999: Market regulation: Bankruptcy Law, Market Competition Law, and Establishment Act 
1999: Regulation and public services: Regulation evaluation and deregulation, administrative 




1982a: Information and advice provision: Evaluation Wittebrug Agreement 1965 that constituted the 
KNOV, NCOV, CIMK consultancy services structure 
  1982b: Information, advice, and assistance policy 
1987:Ondernemershuizen for start-ups and InnovatieCentra for (potential) Gazelles; 
evaluation subsidy for management assistance (SMO) 
  1995: Ondernemershuizen for start-ups and InnovatieCentra for (potential) Gazelles; regional 
start-up support; expertise center foreign entrepreneurs; SME desk on the internet 
  1999: One-stop shop information and public service desk; improving market for professional 
advice; focus on entrepreneurial skills in education and training; improving supply of information 
  2003: Facilitate business transfer via information provision and advice 
   
1982a: Financing and subsidies–Credit Arrangement 1976 
  1982b: Finance and need for equity–Credit Decision for SMEs; evaluation 1985 Credit 
Decision. 
1987, 1995: Financing policy–Loan Guarantee, Loan Guarantee 1988 
1995: Seeder and informal investor agency exploration; technology rating for (potential) 
investors in Gazelles and high-tech businesses  
1999: Productive Economic Climate: Financing and fiscal measures 
 
1982b, 1987: Fiscal and social insurance aspects 
  1995: Fiscal aspects of start-ups and exports and R&D for (high) growth businesses 
  1999: Productive Economic Climate: Financing and fiscal measures 
  2003: Report fiscal aspects of business transfers 
 
1982b, 1987: Establishment Act and training; evaluation Act in 1988, abolition creditworthiness within 
EA54 
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  1995: Modernization Establishment Act 
  1999: Proposal abolition Establishment Act in two steps  
  2003: Execution trajectory EA abolition 
1987: Deregulation (start-ups) 
  1995: Decreasing rules and regulations (start-ups); simplifying business transfer fiscally 
  2003: Transparent rules, public service provision for start-ups and (growing) SMEs 
  2003: Labor market deregulation efforts for (growing) SMEs 
 
1982a: Structural SME policy 
1982a: Development and business discontinuation aid 
  2003: Three action lines business transfer and discontinuation policy 
1982a, 1987: Export policy 
1995: Start-ups program by EVD 
1999: New markets: Continuation start-ups program by EVD 
2003: Family business internationalization 
 
1982a, 1987: Education and labor market alignment policy 
1987: Education and entrepreneurship 
1999: Interdepartmental commission entrepreneurship and education, Mini Business Project, 
and stimulatory policy regarding entrepreneurship in curriculum and intermediary activities regarding 
business-education cooperation 
2003: Entrepreneurial culture: increasing awareness, roadshow, international aspects of 
entrepreneurship in education 
 
 
1982a: Innovation policy 
1987: Technology policy 
1999: Best-practice booklet; inter-public-organizational cooperation to promote high-tech 
business activities. 
 
1982a, 1987: Public procurement 
1982a: Orderly economic trade policy and establishment laws  
 
1982b, 1987: Business housing 
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